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975 
DISAPPEARING WITHOUT A CASE—THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RACE-CONSCIOUS 
SCHOLARSHIPS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Race-conscious scholarships in higher education are disappearing for 
three primary reasons. First, a small handful of independent legal 
nonprofits—led by the Center for Equal Opportunity (CEO) and the 
American Civil Rights Institute (ACRI)—have applied extensive pressure 
on colleges and universities to abandon race-conscious scholarships.1 
Second, the United States Department of Education’s (DOE) Office of 
Civil Rights (OCR),2 became, under the Bush administration, increasingly 
skeptical of race-conscious classifications.3 As OCR has the authority to 
deny federal funds to institutions of higher education that it finds to be in 
violation of Title VI of the Civil Right Act of 1964 (Title VI),4 there is a 
strong incentive for colleges and universities under OCR investigation to 
avoid litigation at all costs. This combination of government and private 
pressure has caused colleges and universities to abandon race-conscious 
scholarships in large numbers. Added to this pressure is a third factor: the 
growing impact of state constitutional bans on affirmative action. As of 
2009, four states—California, Washington, Michigan, and Nebraska—
have voted to ban affirmative action in state programming.5 
While the story of race-conscious scholarships has received attention in 
the higher education and civil rights communities,6 it has gone largely 
unnoticed by the general public. This is due in large part to the informal, 
behind-the-scenes manner in which such scholarships have been 
challenged. Nearly all of the evidence documenting the demise of race-
conscious scholarships exists in complaints and letters sent between the 
 
 
 1. See infra Part II.B (describing CEO and ACRI’s role in the rapid reduction of race-conscious 
scholarships throughout the United States).  
 2. OCR is responsible, among other things, for implementing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. OCR’s mission is “to ensure equal access to education and to promote educational excellence 
throughout the nation through vigorous enforcement of civil rights.” Office for Civil Rights, Overview 
of the Agency, available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/index.html (last visited Feb. 17, 
2009). 
 3. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.  
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2000).  
 5. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 6. The most extensive coverage of the controversy surrounding race-conscious scholarships 
appears in the Chronicle of Higher Education.  
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legal organizations challenging race conscious scholarships (such as CEO 
and ACRI), the colleges and universities that implement the scholarships, 
and OCR, the institution responsible for enforcing Title VI.7 As the courts 
have not addressed the constitutionality of race-conscious scholarships in 
the years since Grutter v. Bollinger,8 colleges and universities have 
become extremely vulnerable to these external pressures calling for the 
scholarships’ elimination.  
The purposes of this Note are twofold. First, it tells the story of race-
conscious scholarships. Part II begins with a discussion of the historical 
and contemporary justifications for race-conscious scholarships, and it 
concludes with a detailed description of the behind-the-scenes letter 
writing campaign that has led to their demise. 
Second, this Note argues that race-conscious scholarships are 
constitutional. Part III sets forth the legal framework. In its 2003 Grutter 
decision, the Supreme Court held that race-conscious university 
admissions policies designed to promote student body diversity9 can 
withstand strict scrutiny under both the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI.10 
While Grutter resolved nearly twenty-five years of doubt with respect 
to the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions programs,11 it left 
programs outside of the admissions context, such as race-conscious 
scholarships, outreach and recruitment, and support and retention 
programs, in a constitutional haze.12 Part III analogizes Grutter in the 
context of race-conscious scholarships and concludes by describing the 
importance of that context in Equal Protection analysis. 
 
 
 7. The author was able to obtain these communications through a Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) request to OCR, as well as through the generosity of Minnesota law professor Karen Miksch, 
who shared the results of one of her previous FOIA requests.  
 8. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 9. For a discussion of the Court’s definition of student body diversity, see infra note 140.  
 10. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
 11. From 1978 until Grutter in 2003, the constitutionality of race-conscious programming in 
higher education was analyzed under the framework of Justice Powell’s lone concurrence in Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 12. For a description of outreach/recruitment and support/retention programs, see infra note 28. 
While it is not the subject of this Note, it is important to mention that race may also be considered via 
facially neutral policies, when those policies are designed to benefit minority students. Because such 
policies do not facially classify individuals on the basis of race, they are unlikely to be subject to strict 
scrutiny. See Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 54 (2d Cir. 1999) (refusing to apply strict 
scrutiny to a police entrance exam that was designed to minimize discriminatory impact on black 
candidates, but did not amount to a facial classification that expressly distinguished between applicants 
on the basis of race).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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With this background established, Part IV analyzes the constitutionality 
of two kinds of race-conscious scholarships: (1) “race-as-a-plus-factor” 
scholarships, where race is one of many factors considered in the 
allocation of benefits; and (2) race-exclusive scholarships, where 
eligibility is restricted on the basis of race.13 Concluding that the vast 
majority of both types are constitutional, this Part calls on colleges and 
universities that value racial diversity to stand their legal ground and 
challenge the assertion that their scholarships are unlawful.  
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF RACE-CONSCIOUS SCHOLARSHIPS 
A. Racial Inequality in Higher Education: The Purpose Behind Race-
Conscious Scholarships  
Race-conscious scholarships were born out of a desire to increase 
African Americans’ access to American colleges and universities and 
thereby advance the goals of racial justice and equality.14 For hundreds of 
years, state and local governments actively resisted the education of 
African Americans, and they did so “regardless of whether that education 
was provided by whites or by African Americans themselves.”15 Prior to 
the Civil War, for example, “almost all southern states forbade teaching 
slaves to read and write and several states extended the prohibition to free 
African-Americans as well.”16 The resistance to the education of African 
Americans that continued well after the Civil War and, indeed, well after 
the Supreme Court declared segregation illegal in 1954, is a familiar story.  
Race-conscious scholarships were originally designed as a response to 
this long history of racial oppression and unequal access to higher 
education, first appearing with the Civil Rights Movement and the rise of 
affirmative action.17 In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson famously 
 
 
 13. When this Note refers to “race-conscious” scholarships, it is referring to both race-as-a-plus-
factor scholarships and race-exclusive scholarships. When referring to one specific scholarship type, 
this Note will refer to it by name, as either a plus-factor or race-exclusive scholarship. 
 14. This goal is noticeably different from the rationale underlying Grutter’s compelling interest 
in “student body diversity.” See infra note 140 and accompanying text. As explained below, the 
express goals of race-conscious scholarships are changing over time: originally justified as a small part 
of the greater effort to remedy America’s long history of slavery and racial oppression, race-conscious 
scholarships are today justified on the grounds of their educational benefit to all students. See id.  
 15. Sean M. Scott, Justice Redefined: Minority-Targeted Scholarships and the Struggle Against 
Racial Oppression, 62 UMKC L. REV. 651, 663 (1994). 
 16. Id. (citing W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA, 1860–1880, at 638 
(Antheneum 1992) (1935)). 
 17. While the concept of affirmative action has existed since the Civil War and Reconstruction, 
the actual phrase “affirmative action” was introduced to the popular discourse in President John F. 
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explained the rationale behind affirmative action; evoking the imagery of 
slavery, he explained: “You do not take a person who, for years, has been 
hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a 
race and then say ‘you are free to compete with all the others,’ and still 
justly believe that you have been completely fair.”18  
Following this logic, and buttressed by the enactment of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights Act, colleges and universities began 
considering race in admissions decisions in order to increase African 
American enrollment. Schools quickly realized, however, that “[w]ithout 
adequate financial aid, minority students, though admitted under the 
revised admission programs, were unable to matriculate.”19 Consequently, 
educational institutions began “restructuring financial aid policies to be 
more responsive to the needs of African-American students . . . [by] 
designat[ing] certain funds which only minority students [would be] 
eligible to receive.”20  
Today, there remains a vast racial disparity in access to higher 
education in America,21 and numerous studies suggest that the disparity is 
growing.22 At the most general level, there are three primary features to 
 
 
Kennedy’s 1961 Executive Order 10925. This Order required federal contractors to “take affirmative 
action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, 
without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.” Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 
1977 (Mar. 8, 1961). President Lyndon B. Johnson used the same language in his affirmative action 
order. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 28, 1965). 
 18. Lyndon B. Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights, Commencement Address at Howard University 
(June 4, 1965), in THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 126 (Lee Rainwater 
& William L. Yancey eds., 1967). Reflecting similar logic, Justice Blackmun, eleven years later, 
explained: “In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. 
And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently.” Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 19. Scott, supra note 15, at 653 (internal citations omitted). 
 20. Id. 
 21. In 2006, the U.S. Census Bureau explained that if you are an African American twenty-five 
years of age or older, you are more likely to be without a high school diploma than you are to have a 
college degree. Conversely, if you are white and in the same age group, you are nearly three times as 
likely to have a college degree than you are to be without a high school diploma. As of 2006, eighty-
one percent of African Americans over the age of 25 had not completed four or more years of college. 
See U.S. Census Bureau, Black History Month: February 2008 (Dec. 3, 2007), available at 
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/cb08ff-01.pdf. 
 22. See Victor B. Saenz et al., Losing Ground? Exploring Racial/Ethnic Enrollment Shifts in 
Freshman Access to Selective Institutions, in CHARTING THE FUTURE OF COLLEGE AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION: LEGAL VICTORIES, CONTINUING ATTACKS, AND NEW RESEARCH 79, 90 (Gary Orfield ed., 
2007) (“[R]elative to the representation in their age-group population, Hispanics and Blacks are losing 
ground while Asian and White students are posting gains in [higher education] access . . . . This access 
gap is even more compelling when one considers that White students are under-reported given their 
increasing tendency to not report their racial status to their institutions.”); see also Leigh Jones, 
Minority Enrollment at Law School Is Faltering, NAT’L. L.J., Feb. 6, 2008, at 1 (“From 1996 to 2006, 
the number of blacks and Mexican-Americans enrolled in the nation’s law schools accredited by the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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this inequality. First, in comparison with whites, “African-American 
students are . . . far less likely to have access to college information and 
resources within their families or communities.”23 Second, once in college, 
the attrition rate for African Americans is significantly higher than for 
their white peers.24 Third, because students of color are “far more likely to 
come from low-income families than their white peers,”25 high tuition 
costs provide a disproportionate impediment to their access to higher 
education.26 Thus, “[e]ven for African-American students who are 
academically prepared, college costs present a significant obstacle to 
enrolling in and graduating from college.”27  
Race-conscious scholarships seek to alleviate the disproportionate 
financial barrier to college access.28 Financial aid is “often the key to 
 
 
American Bar Association (ABA) fell from 3,937 to 3,595. During that same period, the number of 
ABA-accredited law schools grew from 176 to 195.”) (citing Society of American Law Schools and 
Lawyering in the Digital Age Clinic, Columbia University School of Law, A Disturbing Trend in Law 
School Diversity, available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/civilrights/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2009)). 
 23. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., CLOSING THE GAP: MOVING FROM RHETORIC 
TO REALITY IN OPENING DOORS TO HIGHER EDUCATION FOR AFRICAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS 4 (2005) 
[hereinafter NAACP REPORT] (citing SANDRA RUPPERT, CTR. FOR CMTY. COLL. POLICY, CLOSING 
THE COLLEGE PARTICIPATION GAP: A NATIONAL SUMMARY, (2003)). For example,  
African-American students typically attend schools that are unable to provide resources to fill 
the gaps in parental knowledge of, and familiarity with, the college preparation process. 
Whereas the national average ratio of students to guidance counselors is 490:1, the ratio can 
be 1056:1 or higher in schools serving large numbers of minority and low-income students.”  
Id. at 5. Thus, while the number of African-American students enrolling in college is slowly 
increasing, it remains that “[o]nly 55% of African-American high school graduates are enrolling in 
college immediately after high school, in comparison to 64% of white students.” Id.  
 24. For example, “[a]mong African-American students who enrolled in four-year colleges in 
1995–1996, only 36.4% attained a bachelor’s degree in five years, as compared to 58% of white 
students.” Id. (citing AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUC., MINORITIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 2003–2004: 
TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL STATUS REPORT (2005). What’s more, “[n]early one-third of African-
American students (30.1%) dropped out. Even as African-American college enrollment is rising, 
college degree attainment has remained flat.” Id.  
 25. Id.  
 26. “Among 1992 high school graduates, 54% of African Americans were low-income [family 
income of less than $25,000] as compared to 21% of white students.” Id.  
 27. Id.  
 28. In addition to race-conscious scholarships, colleges and universities frequently implement 
outreach/recruitment programs as well as support/retention programs. Outreach and recruitment 
programs are designed to close the preparation and access to information gaps by reaching out to 
minorities before, during, and just after the college admissions process. Examples of such programs 
include: (1) sending recruitment officers to predominately minority high schools to publicize and 
discuss opportunities at a university, (2) minority-specific advertising and public relations materials, 
(3) fairs and open house events specifically for minority applicants, and (4) targeted mailings to 
minority students. Angelo N. Ancheta, Antidiscrimination Law and Race-Conscious Recruitment, 
Retention, and Financial Aid Policies in Higher Education, in CHARTING THE FUTURE OF COLLEGE 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 22, at 27. Further, once students are admitted, university admissions 
officers may offer on-campus programs that provide minority students “an opportunity to visit the 
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encouraging college attendance among low-income students or those who 
are first in their families to consider college.”29 Indeed, as one court 
recognized, “[o]ne of the most important determinants for the majority of 
student enrollment decisions is the receipt of financial aid.”30 Additionally, 
“the amount of aid that institutions offer often determines where highly 
recruited minority students enroll.”31 Moreover, race-based financial aid 
often provides “continued financial support that could mean the difference, 
for some minority students, between continuing their studies or leaving 
school.”32  
While race-conscious financial aid will not, on its own, eliminate the 
inequalities described above, it does have a positive impact. This point 
was not lost on colleges and universities: by the early 1990s (prior to their 
rapid demise), “[e]ighty-nine percent of independent colleges and 
universities, and eighty-three percent of state colleges and universities” 
offered some form of race-based scholarship program.33 
B. The Fall of Race-Conscious Scholarships 
Race-conscious scholarships have been the source of intense 
controversy throughout their history.34 Over the course of the last ten 
 
 
campus and obtain a glimpse of college life, often with travel and housing expenses covered by the 
university.” Id. at 15, 28.  
 Support and retention programs are designed to close the gap in college retention rates by helping 
students of color adjust to predominantly white campus cultures and help keep them in school and 
successful. Examples of support programs include the following programs, when implemented race-
consciously: “[p]re-enrollment summer bridge programs, post-matriculation tutoring programs, student 
centers, housing, graduation ceremonies, mentoring programs, and university funded organizations.” 
R. Richard Banks, Race-Conscious Affirmative Action and Race-Neutral Policies in the Aftermath of 
the Michigan Cases, in CHARTING THE FUTURE OF COLLEGE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 22, at 
35, 47.  
 29. Sara Hebel, Court Rulings May Open the Door for More Use of Race in Student Aid, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), July 4, 2003, at S6. 
 30. Geier v. Sundquist, 128 F. Supp. 2d 519, 538 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (quoting consent decree). 
 31. Hebel, supra note 29.  
 32. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HIGHER EDUCATION: INFORMATION ON MINORITY-
TARGETED SCHOLARSHIPS 10 (1994), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat4/150617.pdf 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].  
 33. Scott, supra note 15, at 661. 
 34. To one scholar, race-conscious scholarships are controversial because of the emotional 
response that they evoke. She explains that such scholarships “are important because they have 
become a metaphor for the struggle African-Americans have engaged in for hundreds of years over the 
right of access to education at all levels. This struggle for access is simply part of the larger struggle 
for justice and equality.” Scott, supra note 15, at 695. For an interesting illustration of this long and 
contested history, see Rachel Spector, Minority Scholarships: A New Battle in the War on Affirmative 
Action, 77 IOWA L. REV. 307, 315 n.60 (1991) (setting forth the conflicted and inconsistent 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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years, this controversy has reached a climax. Affirmative action 
opponents, led by the ACRI and CEO, have initiated a coordinated 
campaign to eliminate the use of race in all university programs.35 Roger 
Clegg, president of CEO and a lead architect of the campaign, claims to 
have contacted over one hundred colleges and universities in order to 
request that they terminate race-conscious programs.36 As a result of these 
communications, Clegg claims that dozens of schools have closed their 
racially exclusive programs.37 These efforts have transformed the 
landscape of race-conscious programming at American universities.38 
Indeed, as of 2004, CEO claimed that of the one hundred colleges and 
universities it had contacted, roughly seventy of them were persuaded 
either to end their affirmative action programs or to open access to the 
programs to all races.39  
 
 
chronology of opinions issued by U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights on race-
conscious scholarships from 1970 to 1989).  
 35. See Kendra Hamilton, Truth and Consequences: In the Michigan Aftermath, the Real Fight 
Begins as Local Institutions Work to Apply the Supreme Court Ruling to Meet Their Campuses’ 
Individual Needs and/or Restrictions, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 25, 2003), available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0DXK/is_16_20/ai_108967471?tag=content;col1 (“The Center 
for Equal Opportunity . . . , which bills itself as ‘the only think tank devoted exclusively to the 
promotion of colorblind equal opportunity and racial harmony,’ has emerged as the pre-eminent 
combatant against race-conscious outreach and admissions policies in the post-Michigan era.”).  
 36. Roger Clegg, Time Has Not Favored Racial Preferences, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., 
D.C.), Jan. 14, 2005, at B10 (“My own Center for Equal Opportunity has contacted well over a 
hundred colleges about illegal faculty discrimination and racially exclusive programs for students. We 
have filed complaints in some of those cases with the Office for Civil Rights, and have now also begun 
bringing such cases—where they involve state institutions—to the attention of the Justice 
Department.”). 
 37. Id. (“[T]he overwhelming majority of colleges that we have contacted—Carnegie Mellon 
University, Harvard University, Indiana University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Northwestern University, Princeton University, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 
Williams College, Yale University, and dozens of others—have opened up racially exclusive programs 
to all students, regardless of race.”).  
 38. See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
 39. Peter Schmidt, Not Just for Minority Students Anymore, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., 
D.C.), Mar. 19, 2004, at A17. But see Karen Miksch, Stand Your Ground: Legal and Policy 
Justifications for Race-Conscious Programming, in CHARTING THE FUTURE OF COLLEGE 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 22, at 57, 70–71 (explaining “I was able to confirm that 53 
institutions had been contacted by the CEO and ACRI. I was never able to find the rest of the 100 
institutions that the organizations claim they contacted, nor were they willing to provide the list. . . . 
Ultimately I was able to confirm that 71 programs at 53 institutions were changed or discontinued 
between 1995 to 2005.”). See also Jonathan D. Glater, Colleges Open Minority Aid to All Comers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2006, at A1 (where Roger Clegg states that “since 2003 his center had sent 200 
challenges to colleges and universities over race-based scholarships and other programs, warning of 
legal action if changes were not made. He [Clegg] said more than 150 institutions had broadened their 
programs in response.”). Definitive answers are hard to come by, in part because “[n]either the Justice 
Department nor Education Department, nor organizations on all sides of the discussions over 
affirmative action, have gathered statistics tracking the trend.” Id. What’s more, “[f]irm data on how 
many institutions have modified their policies is elusive because colleges and institutions are not eager 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This Part tells the story of the demise of race-conscious scholarships. 
Part II.B.1 provides examples of scholarship programs that have been 
either shut down or drastically re-organized. Part II.B.2 examines the 
actual communications between CEO, OCR, and colleges and universities, 
and reveals the manner in which so many schools have caved to CEO and 
OCR pressure. Finally, Part II.B.3 addresses the separate but important 
impact of statewide affirmative action bans.  
1. Examples of Scholarships That Have Been Shut Down 
Washington University’s John B. Ervin Scholars Program (“Ervin 
Program”) is representative of the experiences at these institutions.40 Until 
2005, the Ervin Program provided full tuition and a $2,500 annual stipend 
to “United States citizens who are African Americans.”41 The Ervin 
Program was “[n]amed in honor of the nationally renowned black 
educator, John B. Ervin [and designed to] recognize the intellectual, 
leadership, and service achievements of African-American students.”42 In 
addition to the tuition and scholarship money, Ervin Scholars 
“participate[d] in a program [including] orientation to the University, 
meetings with University and community leaders, academic support and 
advising, assistance in finding research and internship positions, and 
events with other Ervin Scholars and the program’s director, among 
others.”43  
In response to CEO and OCR pressure about the Ervin Program,44 
Washington University signed a Resolution Agreement in 2005 that stated, 
 
 
to trumpet the changes.” Id. “Travis Reindl, director of state policy analysis at the American 
Association of State Colleges and Universities, said hundreds, if not thousands, of scholarship and 
fellowship programs historically used race as a criterion.” Id. According to the New York Times, “Mr. 
Reindl estimated that as many as half of the four-year colleges in the United States had reviewed or 
modified such programs.” Id.  
 40. See Peter Schmidt, From ‘Minority’ to ‘Diversity:’ The Transformation of Formerly Race-
Exclusive Programs May Be Leaving Some Students Out in the Cold, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., 
D.C.), Feb. 3, 2006, at A24 (gathering data on race-conscious scholarships from numerous colleges 
and universities); Schmidt, supra note 39.  
 41. Description of John B. Ervin Scholarship, August 22, 2003 (on file with author). Washington 
University also implemented the Annika Rodriguez Scholarship, which was open only to Hispanic 
students and also provided full tuition. See Ancheta, supra note 28, at 30. Like the Ervin Program, the 
Rodriguez scholarship, in the same year, was opened to all races. Id. Today, Rodriguez Scholarships 
are awarded “based on academic performance, commitment to serving or working with 
underprivileged populations, and the ability to bring diverse people together.” Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id.  
 44. See infra Part II.B.2 for a description of the letter-writing exchange between Washington 
University, CEO, and OCR. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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“Beginning with the University’s Class of 2009, and continuing for the 
term of this Agreement, the University will no longer select Ervin 
Program participants using the former, race-exclusive criteria.”45 
Accordingly, rather than consider race, the program now accepts:  
U.S. citizens [who] have challenged themselves and excelled 
academically, can demonstrate leadership, have engaged in or 
shown a commitment to community service, can demonstrate their 
commitment to bringing diverse people together . . . , have 
demonstrated a commitment to serving historically underprivileged 
populations, and/or can demonstrate achievement and determination 
in the face of personal challenges.46 
Opening the Ervin Program to nonminority students has had a large 
impact on the number of minority students served. In a letter sent from 
Washington University to the Chronicle of Higher Education, the 
university explained that in the 2005–06 school year (the first after the 
scholarship was opened), twelve of the forty-two Ervin Scholarships, or 
nearly thirty percent, were awarded to white students.47  
This story has been repeated at colleges and universities throughout the 
United States.48 To better understand the nature and range of race-based 
financial aid, the remainder of this section provides short descriptions of a 
small sample of programs.  
At Saint Louis University (SLU), the Ernest A. Calloway Jr. 
scholarship once awarded thirty annual scholarships of $11,000 per year to 
 
 
 45. Resolution Agreement, May 13, 2005 (on file with author). 
 46. Washington University, John B. Ervin Scholars Program—All Undergraduate Schools, 
http://admissions.wustl.edu/scholarships/programs/Pages/Ervin.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). This 
revised selection criteria was established in the 2005 Resolution Agreement.  
 Roger Clegg, director of CEO, has suggested that depending on how the scholarship is 
implemented, even these criteria may be illegal.  
Mr. Clegg . . . argues that colleges are still engaging in racial discrimination if they operate 
programs that require white and Asian applicants to come from disadvantaged backgrounds or 
show a commitment to diversity, but don’t make the same demands of black, Hispanic, or 
American Indian students.  
If a program’s criteria on views toward diversity essentially amount to a requirement that 
applicants ‘sign a pledge of allegiance to political correctness,’ the program could be 
challenged on First Amendment grounds . . . .”  
Schmidt, supra note 39.  
 47. Schmidt, supra note 40; see also Glater, supra note 39 (“Some white students are qualifying 
for the aid. . . . [In 2006], the first year since the [Ervin Program] change, 12 of the 42 first-year 
recipients are white.”).  
 48. For a list of examples, see Schmidt, supra note 39; Schmidt, supra note 40; Glater, supra 
note 39.  
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black students.49 In 2004, under pressure from OCR, SLU terminated the 
program and replaced it with the Martin Luther King Jr. Scholarship 
Program (“King Scholarship”).50 King Scholarships, valued at $13,000 per 
year, are “granted to students who are committed to the promotion of 
diversity in our society and who demonstrate leadership in the classroom, 
on campus and in the greater community.”51 In its first year, the King 
Scholars Program, significantly larger than the Calloway Scholarship 
before it, selected one American Indian, sixteen Asian Americans, thirty-
two African Americans, ten Hispanics, and eighteen whites.52 In its second 
year, it admitted two Alaskan Natives, nineteen Asian Americans, fifty-
seven African Americans, twenty-nine Hispanics, and forty-five whites.53  
The State University of New York (SUNY) once operated the 
Underrepresented Graduate Fellowship Program, which distributed $6.2 
million in financial aid to 500 students, and the Empire State Minority 
Honors Scholarship Program, which distributed $649,000 a year to 898 
students.54 Prior to 2006, both programs—designed to recruit, enroll and 
retain students who were historically underrepresented at SUNY—were 
open only to black, Hispanic, and American Indian students.55 In January 
2006, however, the SUNY Board of Trustees “voted unanimously to 
expand the eligibility criteria”56 by opening the programs to all races.  
Southern Illinois University (SIU) once offered three fellowship 
programs: the Proactive Recruitment of Multicultural Professional for 
Tomorrow program, the Bridge to the Doctorate Fellowship program, and 
the Graduate Dean’s Fellowship Program, each reserved exclusively for 
women or members of minority groups.57 In a November 4, 2005, letter to 
SIU, the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division stated that the 
university, through its fellowships, had “engaged in a pattern or practice of 
intentional discrimination against whites, nonpreferred minorities, and 
males.”58 Through months of legal discussions and investigations, SIU 
 
 
 49. Schmidt, supra note 39. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Saint Louis University Undergraduate Admission, Martin Luther King, Jr. Scholarship, 
http://www.slu.edu/x5175.xml (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).  
 52. Schmidt, supra note 40. In these first two years, the scholarships were for $8,000, not 
$13,000.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Glater, supra note 39. 
 55. Schmidt, supra note 40. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Peter Schmidt, Justice Dept. is Expected to Sue Southern Illinois University Over Minority 
Fellowships, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Nov. 25, 2005, at A34 
 58. Id. Schmidt notes that the case against SIU was “the first time that the Justice Department [as 
opposed to the DOE] has stepped into the fray . . . .” Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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“strongly denied allegations of any intentional discrimination,” explaining 
that they have always felt that the fellowships in question were but a small 
part of an overall graduate assistance effort that allows thousands of 
students, from every imaginable culture and background, to pursue their 
degrees while working at Southern Illinois University.”59 Despite this 
passionate defense of its race-conscious programs, SIU signed a consent 
decree with the Department of Justice. As part of the decree, the university 
agreed to “[d]iscontinue any information that suggests that paid fellowship 
positions are restricted on the basis of race, national origin or sex.”60 
Today, therefore, SIU’s diversity fellowships, originally created for 
minorities and women, are open to whites and men.61  
2. The Letter Writing Campaign: Pressure Behind the Scenes 
CEO and ACRI, the driving forces behind almost all of these changes, 
have exerted this pressure via a letter-writing campaign.62 In the typical 
case, CEO will send a letter to a university first requesting that it terminate 
its race-based program and, second, threatening to file a complaint with 
OCR if the university fails to comply. For example, in a joint letter from 
CEO and ACRI to Washington University, the authors state: “We request 
that you open the [Ervin Program] to all students regardless of skin color 
or where there [sic] ancestors came from.”63 Two sentences later, they 
continue: “If we do not receive a satisfactory response from you [in three 
weeks time], we will file a formal complaint with [OCR] . . . .”64  
Not all institutions have immediately complied with CEO’s initial 
request. For example, Washington University wrote a letter back to 
CEO/ACRI arguing that the Ervin Program is “intended to allow the 
 
 
 59. Remarks by Dr. Glenn Poshard, President, Southern Illinois University, SIU Board of 
Trustees Meeting, Feb. 8, 2006, available at http://news.siu.edu/news/February06/020806bot6001.jsp. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Southern Illinois has tried, via race-neutral means, to preserve the original intent of its 
fellowships. For example, the Graduate Dean’s Fellowship is now open to “traditionally underserved 
individuals who have overcome social, cultural or economic conditions that have adversely affected 
their educational progress.” See Southern Illinois University, Graduate Dean’s Fellowship Application 
Material, available at http://www.siu.edu/gradschl/grad-deans_fellowship.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 
2009). 
 62. Peter Schmidt, supra note 40 (“Many of the colleges that have opened up race-exclusive 
programs have done so in response to letters of complaint from [CEO and ACRI]. ‘We are making a 
real effort to visit the Web site of every college and university in the country over the next year’ to 
look for evidence of race-exclusive programs, says the center’s Mr. Clegg.”).  
 63. Letter from Edward Blum, Dir. of Legal Affairs, ACRI, and Roger Clegg, Gen. Counsel, 
CEO, to Michael Cannon, Gen. Counsel, Washington Univ. (Mar. 17, 2003) (on file with author).  
 64. Id.  
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University to achieve the compelling interest of providing all of its 
students the educational benefits of a diverse student body” and thus “fully 
complies with current applicable law.”65 Similarly, the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) responded to a CEO/ACRI complaint by 
explaining that “[t]he opportunities that MIT provides to underrepresented 
minorities are entirely consistent with the Federal Government’s efforts to 
further [the] compelling national purpose [of creating a diverse student 
body].”66 SLU, responding to a CEO/ACRI letter about the Ernest A. 
Calloway Jr. Scholarship, maintained that “It is the University’s judgment 
that [Calloway Scholarships] represent lawful initiatives under current law 
. . . .”67 
When colleges and universities disputed CEO/ACRI’s arguments, 
CEO/ACRI consistently honored its promise by filing a formal complaint 
with OCR. For example, with respect to SLU, CEO and ACRI wrote to 
OCR:  
[W]e asked SLU to open up its racially and ethnically exclusive 
programs and scholarships to students of all skin colors . . . . SLU, 
however, has declined to do so.  
We request that OCR investigate any of SLU’s racially and 
ethnically exclusive programs and scholarships and make clear to 
SLU that they must be made available to students on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, if the school is to continue to receive 
federal funding.68  
Time and again, such outsider requests for formal OCR investigation 
were enough to convince universities to comply by either terminating their 
programs or, more commonly, by opening them up to all races. With 
respect to Washington University, OCR explained: “Prior to the 
completion of our investigation the University advised OCR of its intent to 
address the allegations of the complaint by adopting new eligibility criteria 
 
 
 65. Letter from Michael R. Cannon, Gen. Counsel, Washington Univ., to Edward Blum, Dir. of 
Legal Affairs, ACRI, and Roger Clegg, Gen. Counsel, CEO (Apr. 10, 2003) (on file with author).  
 66. Letter from Jamie Lewis Keith, Senior Counsel, MIT, to Edward Blum, Dir. of Legal Affairs, 
ACRI, and Roger Clegg, Gen. Counsel, CEO (Mar. 15, 2001) (on file with author).  
 67. Letter from William R. Kauffman, Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Saint Louis Univ., to 
Edward Blum, Dir. of Legal Affairs, ACRI, and Roger Clegg, Gen. Counsel, CEO (Mar. 14, 2003) (on 
file with author).  
 68. Letter from Edward Blum, Dir. of Legal Affairs, ACRI, and Roger Clegg, Gen. Counsel, 
CEO, to Hon. Gerald Reynolds, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Mar. 18, 2003) 
(on file with author).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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for the Ervin Scholars Program . . . that would not include race.”69 Indeed, 
the parties entered a formal resolution that resolved the complaint.70 
Similarly, after OCR inquiry, both SLU and MIT entered into resolution 
agreements with OCR that eliminated the use of race in their programs.71 
According to one scholar, this pattern shows that “institutions appear to 
be responding to negative publicity and the threat of litigation without 
fully considering how current social science research and case law support 
their efforts.”72 Karen Miksch conducted extensive research to determine 
why so many race-conscious programs were changing. She explained: 
The most common reason given for changing a program was an 
investigation by the OCR, or a perceived threat that OCR would 
investigate the program. Nineteen percent of the programs provided 
“Pressure from advocacy groups” as a reason. In addition [to these 
reasons,] . . . staff reported an overall feeling that there was a hostile 
legal environment regarding race-conscious programs.73 
The high-stakes risk of Title VI, in conjunction with the OCR’s general 
opposition to race-exclusive programming, helps to explain why so many 
institutions retreat in the face of a legal fight. First, Title VI, because it 
grants OCR the authority to deny federal funds to any recipient found to 
be in violation of the Act,74 creates a strong incentive for universities 
under OCR investigation to avoid litigation at all costs. Under Title VI, if 
any part of an institution receives federal funding, the entire institution 
must comply or risk withdrawal of all funds.75 Thus, “if the law school at 
State U. has a race-exclusive scholarship program that violates Title VI, 
then all federal aid to State U.—even aid to a program in the university 
completely unrelated to the law school—is in jeopardy of being 
terminated.”76 Universities—especially large research institutions that 
 
 
 69. Letter from Angela Bennett, Office Dir., Kansas City Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., to Mark S. Wrighton, Chancellor, Washington Univ. (May 13, 2005) (on file with author) 
(emphasis added).  
 70. Resolution Agreement, Washington University in St. Louis and the U.S. Department of 
Education, Office for Civil Rights, No. 07042001 (May 13, 2005) (on file with author). 
 71. Schmidt, supra note 39.  
 72. Miksch, supra note 39, at 59. 
 73. Id. at 72. Miksch found that twenty programs were changed because of agency investigation 
or threat, nineteen because of pressure from an advocacy group, fifteen because of institutional review 
of a program, seven because of a complaint by an individual, four because of a hostile legal 
environment, three because of no funding, and sixteen for unknown reasons. Id. at tbl. 3-2.  
 74. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Education and Title VI, http://www.ed. 
gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/hq43e4.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Kirk A. Kennedy, Race-Exclusive Scholarships: Constitutional Vel Non, 30 WAKE FOREST 
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depend on federal funding—would be reluctant to risk that funding on the 
outcome of litigation challenging OCR’s findings.  
Second, both supporters and critics of affirmative action agree that 
OCR under the Bush Administration has been hostile to affirmative 
action.77 Roger Clegg, general counsel of CEO, explained in 2004 that: 
The Civil-Rights Office of the Education Department has 
demonstrated that it takes seriously the requirement in Grutter that 
admissions preferences be prohibited in circumstances where 
diversity is attainable by race-neutral means. It has published and is 
continuing to publish materials elaborating on those means. 
Likewise, it has stated that it views racially exclusive scholarships, 
internships, summer programs, and the like as “extremely difficult 
to defend.” It has pressured individual colleges and, most recently, 
the state of Wisconsin to open up such programs to students of all 
colors. The Justice Department's Civil-Rights Division—headed by 
R. Alexander Acosta, who is no friend of affirmative action—has 
recently begun to investigate such programs itself . . . .78 
Gary Orfield, director of the UCLA Civil Rights Project, explained: 
No sooner was the ink dry on the [Grutter] decision . . . that [sic] 
opponents of affirmative action, who happened to control the US 
Departments of Education and Justice as well as the federal civil 
rights enforcement offices, began to narrow the interpretation of 
Grutter. . . . Federal civil rights officials strongly suggested that 
colleges were obliged to try non-racial strategies and claimed that 
such strategies were workable. In other words, the opponents of 
affirmative action attempted to interpret the law as if they had won 
the case.79  
 
 
L. REV. 759, 782 (1995).  
 77. See Schmidt, supra note 39 (“The current leaders of the civil-rights office [are] mostly 
staunch critics of affirmative action . . . .”); Peter Schmidt, Excluding Some Races from Programs? 
Expect a Letter from a Lawyer, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Mar. 7, 2003, at A22 (noting 
that Roger Clegg “called President Bush’s appointments to key Education Department positions 
dealing with civil rights ‘absolutely first-rate.’”).  
 78. Clegg, supra note 36.  
 79. Gary Orfield, Introduction to CHARTING THE FUTURE OF COLLEGE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, 
supra note 22, at xi, xi. The Chronicle of Higher Education has reported that anti-affirmative action 
groups have an inside track at OCR. Indeed, “Two of the most recent additions to [OCR’s] staff, Hans 
Brader and Curt A. Levey, worked at the Center for Individual Rights, which helped represent the 
Michigan plaintiffs [in Grutter].” Jeffrey Selingo, Michigan: Who Really Won?, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 14, 2005, at A21; see also NAACP REPORT, supra note 23, at 77 n.76. 
Supporters of affirmative action have taken notice of OCR’s interpretation of Grutter. In a 2005 letter 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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These pressures have resulted in significant changes to race-conscious 
scholarship programs across the country. According to Miksch, fourteen 
schools recently renamed their programs, eleven discontinued them, and 
fifty opened their doors to all students.80 Of those fifty, thirty-two no 
longer consider race in any way, but rather “look for students who are 
‘committed to a diverse campus.’”81 Another eleven programs “no longer 
consider race but consider socio-economic factors as a way to ensure a 
diverse student body.”82 Finally, “only 7 continue to consider race as one 
factor in ensuring campus diversity.”83 There is little doubt, therefore, that 
OCR interventions have exerted a strong impact on institutions’ 
willingness to implement race-conscious scholarships.  
3. The Growing Impact of Statewide Affirmative Action Bans 
State bans on affirmative action have also contributed to the decline in 
race-conscious scholarships. Grutter allows educational institutions to 
adopt race-conscious measures, but does not require them to do so. As a 
result, anti-affirmative action activists, led by Ward Connerly, chairman of 
ACRI, have launched campaigns to pass state laws that outlaw affirmative 
action in state programming.  
The story of Michigan is emblematic. In November 2006, the voters of 
Michigan enacted Proposal 2, a ballot initiative—much like those enacted 
in California84 and Washington85 in the 1990s—that bans the use of race-
 
 
to Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings, Theodore Shaw, President of the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund (LDF), expressed “grave concern” that OCR was “undermining” the 
visions of Grutter and Brown. Letter from Theodore Shaw, Director-Counsel and President, NAACP 
LDF, to Hon. Margaret Spellings, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (June 23, 2005) available at 
http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/gap/Letter_to_Education_Secretary_Spellings.pdf. According to 
Shaw, OCR was not helping universities to achieve student body diversity, but rather:  
OCR is instead standing in the way. Presumably with the backing of [OCR], groups opposed 
to affirmative action have sent out . . . letters to colleges and universities across the nation 
threatening to file complaints with OCR if any and all race-conscious measures are not 
eliminated. Whether at the behest of these organizations or not, OCR coincidentally has been 
backing up these threats by opening investigations . . . creating a climate of fear and 
intimidation.  
Id.  
 80. Miksch, supra note 39, at 73. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.  
 84. In 1996, California voters passed the California Civil Rights Initiative, also know as 
Proposition 209. Proposition 209 amended the state constitution by providing that “[t]he State shall not 
discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, 
sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or 
public contracting.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a). Notably, Proposition 209 allowed colleges “to 
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conscious measures by state and local government. In relevant part, 
Proposal 2 prohibits Michigan’s public universities from “discriminat[ing] 
against, or grant[ing] preferential treatment to, any individual or group on 
the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of 
public employment, public education, or public contracting.”86 As a result, 
Proposal 2 prohibits Michigan’s public universities from considering race 
as a factor in admissions decisions, as constitutionally upheld in Grutter, 
as well as in certain non-admissions areas, such as financial aid.87 
Michigan State University explained that, whereas before Proposal 2 
“individuals reviewing admissions applications were . . . provided with an 
applicant’s complete file, sometimes including notation of an applicant’s 
race . . . the process has been adjusted to mask such data so that it is not 
available to individuals reviewing applications.”88 With respect to 
assistance programs, Michigan State’s Office of Racial Ethnic Student 
Affairs (ORESA) “has embraced a broader and more inclusive mission 
 
 
continue to conduct diversity-based recruitment and outreach efforts and to collect statistical data 
about the participation of minorities and women in their programs.” Toni Lester, Contention, Context, 
and the Constitution: Riding the Waves of the Affirmative Action Debate, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 
119 (2005).  
 As a result of Proposition 209, “[t]he number of black students at both Berkeley and U.C.L.A. 
plummeted, and at U.C.L.A. the declines continued throughout the next decade. . . . In 1997, the 
freshman class included 221 black students; [in 2006] it had only 100. In the region with easily the 
largest black population west of the Mississippi River, the top public university had a freshman class 
in which barely 1 in 50 students was black.” David Leonhardt, The New Affirmative Action, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007 (Magazine), at 77–78. Further, “in 1997, Boalt Hall enrolled just one African 
American student in its entering J.D. class, compared to 20 in 1996,” the year before Proposition 209 
was implemented. Helen Hyun, Falling Sky: Trends in Minority Access to Law Schools, Pre- and 
Post-Gratz and Grutter, in CHARTING THE FUTURE OF COLLEGE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 22, 
at 105, 115. 
 85. In November 1998, Washington voters passed Initiative 200, which restricts the use of race 
and ethnicity in public employment, education, and contracting decisions. “Since Initiative 200 (I-200) 
was passed . . . , the percentage of [underrepresented minority students] in each first-year class at [the 
University of Washington School of Law], the state’s top public law school, has dropped from an 
average of 11% in 1996 to about 7% in 2004.” Id.  
 86. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26, cl. 1. 
 87. The initial effect of Proposition 2 was a large fallout in diversity numbers. The Michigan 
Daily reported that University of Michigan Law School’s minority acceptance rates fell thirty-four 
percentage points after Proposal 2:  
39.6 percent of underrepresented minority applicants considered before the ban on affirmative 
action took effect were admitted to the Law School. But after implementation of the law, only 
5.4 percent of underrepresented minority applicants were admitted.  
Over the same period, the acceptance rates for applicants who did not benefit from race-based 
preferences increased form 16.2 percent before the ban to 26.7 percent afterward.  
Walter Nowinski, Law School Sees Expected Fallout from Prop 2, MICH. DAILY, June 11, 2007, at A8. 
 88. Diversity and Inclusion at MSU After Proposal 2 Frequently Asked Questions, Jan. 23, 2007, 
http://president.msu.edu/prop2response/faqs/index.php (on file with Washington University Law 
Review).  
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and has changed its name to the Office of Cultural and Academic 
Transitions. The ORESA Aide program has . . . assumed a broader 
mission and has changed its name to the Transition and Cultural Aide 
Program.”89  
In assessing the legal landscape of race-based assistance programs, 
state ballot initiatives are no longer a fringe topic affecting a select few. As 
of 2009, Michigan, California, Washington, and Nebraska have passed 
affirmative action bans.90 Writing before Nebraska’s 2008 ban, Peter 
Schmidt explained:  
California, Michigan, and Washington, together account for about 
17.7 percent of the nation’s population. If the five states being eyed 
by Mr. Connerly pass such measures, the share of the U.S. 
population living in states with such bans will rise to just over 25 
percent. Add Florida—where the former Republican governor, Jeb 
Bush, curtailed affirmative-action preferences in state government 
through a 1999 executive order and subsequently persuaded the 
governing board of the state’s universities to follow suit—and the 
share of Americans living where public colleges cannot consider 
applicants’ race now stands at about 23.7 percent and could rise to 
just over 31 percent as a result of the 2008 vote.91 
While Nebraska was the only state to pass an affirmative action ban in 
2008,92 the impact of state ballot initiatives should not be underestimated. 
If the campaign to enact such bans continues to spread, the interpretive 
 
 
 89. Id. Further, the University changed its Affirmative Action statement from “MSU is an 
affirmative-action, equal opportunity institution” to “MSU is an affirmative-action equal-opportunity 
employer.” Id. (emphasis added). The University of Michigan explained on its website that a wide 
range of race-conscious programs, “including financial aid, outreach, and mentoring programs” 
consider race and therefore must be reviewed. Proposal 2 Information: Questions and Answers 
Regarding Proposal 2, Jan. 10, 2007, http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/diversityresources/prop2faq. 
html (on file with Washington University Law Review).  
 90. In the 2008 election, Ward Connerly attempted to pass affirmative action bans in Arizona, 
Missouri, Oklahoma, Colorado, and Nebraska. While he succeeded in Nebraska, he lost to a popular 
vote in Colorado and failed to get on the ballot in Arizona, Missouri, and Oklahoma. These ballot 
failures were due largely to invalid signature issues. For example, On August 21, 2008, the Arizona 
Secretary of State’s office ruled that Connerly’s organization, the Arizona Civil Rights Initiative, did 
not have enough valid signatures to qualify for the ballot. Over 100,000 signatures were rejected for 
reasons such as missing or inaccurate information from signers, or signers who were not registered 
voters in the state. See NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., Attempt to Block Access to Equal 
Opportunity Doomed in Arizona, Aug. 21, 2008, http://www.naacpldf.org/printable.aspx?article= 
1308.  
 91. Peter Schmidt, 3 States Poised to Vote on Affirmative Action, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., 
D.C.), July 18, 2008, at A17. 
 92. See supra note 90.  
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battle over Grutter may take second stage, as the real battle over race-
conscious programming shifts to state and local political arenas.93  
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
The use of race in financial aid programs is governed by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment94 and Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.95 The Supreme Court has made clear that Title VI 
“proscribe[s] only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal 
Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment.”96 
While the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state actors, Title VI 
applies to any recipient of federal funds, public or private.97 Thus, because 
Title VI is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause, a university can 
avoid constitutional scrutiny only by showing that it does not accept 
federal funds.  
Because private corporations, foundations, individual donors, and other 
outside entities are often involved in the funding and implementation of 
race-based scholarships and outreach programs,98 the triggers for Title VI 
liability in this context are not always clear. According to one scholar, “[i]t 
is unlikely that a university can shield itself entirely from Title VI or 
constitutional review simply because the source of the funding is 
 
 
 93. See Michele S. Moses, Patricia Marin, and John T. Yun, Ballot Initiatives That Oppose 
Affirmative Action Hurt All, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Oct. 10, 2008, at A39 (the debate 
over the use of race in higher education decision making “has increasingly moved from the courts to 
the political arena”).  
 94. The Equal Protection Clause provides that, “no State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 95. Title VI provides that, “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or 
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000(d) (2000).  
 96. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (alteration in original); see also Nondiscrimination in Federally 
Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756, 8758 (Feb. 23, 1994) (“Title VI prohibits intentional 
classifications based on race and national origin to the same extent and under the same standards as the 
Equal Protection Clause.”) (citing Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)). 
 97. According to OCR, the agencies and institutions covered by Title VI include: “50 state 
education agencies, their subrecipients, and vocational rehabilitation agencies; the education and 
vocational rehabilitation agencies of the District of Columbia and of the territories and possessions of 
the United States; 16,000 local education systems; 3,200 colleges and universities; 10,000 proprietary 
institutions; and other institutions, such as libraries and museums that receive ED funds.” Education 
and Title VI, supra note 74. 
 98. See Ancheta, supra note 28, at 32 (“[B]illions of scholarship dollars are distributed by non-
university-affiliated organizations ranging from corporate sponsors, private foundations, professional 
and academic associations, unions, and nonprofits groups.”).  
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private.”99 This is particularly true “if the university is charged with 
administering the program and with selecting the individuals to receive the 
funding.”100 If a university does not exert sufficient control over the 
donating entity, however, Title VI should not apply.101 Notably, legal 
concerns may remain even for institutions outside of Title VI’s reach. At 
the fringe of civil rights law today—and beyond the scope of this Note—is 
the applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to fully private race-based 
scholarships.102 
Part III.A asks whether strict scrutiny need apply to race-based 
scholarships in general. Assuming that strict scrutiny does apply, Part III.B 
reviews both Supreme Court and DOE interpretations of the compelling 
interest and narrow tailoring prongs of strict scrutiny. The legal framework 
section concludes, in Part III.C, with a discussion of the importance of 
context in strict scrutiny analysis.  
 
 
 99. Id. at 31. Notably, it takes only minimal amounts of federal funding to trigger Title VI 
liability. Indeed, one court has held that a university with a student body consisting of 221 students 
receiving benefits under federal assistance programs for veterans was a recipient of federal assistance 
under Title VI. Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 602 (D.S.C. 1974). 
 100. Ancheta, supra note 28, at 31. 
 101. Even Roger Clegg, a leader in the anti-affirmative action movement, recently noted that 
public universities may survive Title VI challenges to race-based scholarships funded and 
administered by private nonprofit groups that are legally separate from the university. Andy Guess, 
Race-Based Aid, After a Statewide Ban, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 24, 2007, http://www.inside 
highered.com/news/2007/10/24/michigan. One such organization, the Alumni Association of the 
University of Michigan, announced in October of 2007 that it would offer race-based scholarships to 
the University of Michigan. “Whether the Michigan plan passes legal muster comes mainly down to 
whether it is, in fact, completely separate from any state-affiliated entities.” Id. Clegg explained that, 
“If there’s no connection with the university . . . and if the organization is itself not considered a part 
of the state, and if this is potentially a gift, if there is no contractual issue, then [the Alumni 
Association] might be able to do this.” Id. 
 102. Section 1981 provides: “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the 
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, 
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as 
is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000). The statute applies not only to private 
colleges and universities, but also to “non-university affiliated private foundations and organizations, 
so long as a contract is involved.” Ancheta, supra note 28, at 25. Because certain forms of financial 
aid, outreach, and support programs are established through contractual agreements—and because the 
Supreme Court has held that a contract for educational services is a contract for purposes of § 1981 
(see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976))—§ 1981 may apply to a broad range of purely 
private university actions. For analysis of this issue, see Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi, 
470 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (upholding, under § 1981, a private school system’s race-
exclusive admissions program aimed at improving the educational opportunities of historically 
marginalized Native Hawaiians).  
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A. Is Strict Scrutiny the Proper Standard of Review for Race-Conscious 
Scholarships? 
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,103 the Supreme Court held that 
under the Equal Protection Clause racial classifications imposed by federal 
or state government actors are subject to strict scrutiny.104 While Adarand 
“did not precisely define the term ‘racial classification’ for equal 
protection purposes, the plurality opinion described such classifications as 
burdening or benefiting individuals on the basis of race, or subjecting 
individuals to unequal treatment.”105 Thus, under this description, “a racial 
classification that does not confer a benefit or impose a burden on an 
individual would not implicate the equal protection clause.”106  
While this logic should save many race-conscious outreach and 
recruitment programs from strict scrutiny,107 it is unlikely to save race-
 
 
 103. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 104. Id. at 227. The Court explained that “any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand 
that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that 
person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.” Id. at 224.  
 105. Honadle v. Univ. of Vt., 56 F. Supp. 2d 419, 427 (D. Vt. 1999) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. 
at 222, 224) (citation omitted).  
 106. Id. at 428. The Honadle court further notes that “Adarand involved an inducement to hire; it 
did not discuss race-conscious yet nonpreferential activities such as recruiting or other forms of 
outreach.” Id. 
 107. Numerous lower court decisions have held that strict scrutiny does not apply to race-
conscious outreach and recruitment programs because they do not lead to unequal treatment. One court 
held that Adarand “supports a distinction between ‘inclusive’ forms of affirmative action, such as 
recruitment and other forms of outreach, and ‘exclusive’ forms of affirmative action, such as quotas, 
set asides, and layoffs.” Honadle, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 428 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 222, 224). See 
also Shufrod v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 897 F. Supp. 1535, 1551–52 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (when outreach 
programs “seek to ensure that as many qualified candidates as possible make it to the selection 
process” they are inclusive, cause no harm to third parties, and are thus not subject to strict scrutiny). 
Thus, “[a] public university may . . . be racially ‘aware’ or ‘conscious’ by . . . encouraging broader 
recruiting of racial and ethnic minorities, without triggering the equal protection clause’s strict scrutiny 
review. These activities do not impose burdens or benefits, nor do they subject individuals to unequal 
treatment.” Honadle, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 428. 
 Similarly, in 2002, a federal district court rejected an equal protection challenge to a City 
University of New York Law School policy that “specifies that the Law School strives to achieve 
diversity through recruiting efforts to attract a broad applicant pool including, among others, minority 
applicants.” Weser v. Glen, 190 F. Supp. 2d 384, 398 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d 41 Fed. App’x 521 (2d Cir. 
2002). The court held that race-conscious outreach and recruitment programs “directed at broader 
recruiting of minorities and women . . . [do] not constitute discrimination.” Id. at 399. Thus, the court 
explained that “[r]acial classifications that ‘serve to broaden a pool of qualified applicants and to 
encourage equal opportunity,’ but do not confer a benefit or impose a burden do not implicate the 
Equal Protection Clause.” Id. (quoting Honadle, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 427–28). As one commentator 
explained, when outreach and recruitment “do not typically impose the same level of burden that an 
admissions process can impose—compare . . .exclusion from the university with not receiving 
additional information through a race-sensitive outreach campaign—there may be no constitutional 
injury to trigger strict scrutiny.” Ancheta, supra note 28, at 22. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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conscious financial aid programs. According to one pro-affirmative action 
manual, “[a] financial aid or scholarship program that takes into account a 
student’s race—either as an eligibility requirement or as a factor in the 
awarding process—will trigger strict scrutiny analysis because the 
program subjects persons to different treatment on the basis of their 
race.”108 Unlike many outreach and recruitment programs, which seek only 
to expand the pool of qualified applicants, financial aid can be a decisive 
factor in a student’s decision to attend a given college, and thus a closer 
analogy to selective admissions in Grutter and Gratz.109 The Supreme 
Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1110 directly addressed the strict scrutiny issue. While the four 
members of the Parents Involved dissent would apply “a more lenient 
standard than ‘strict scrutiny’”111 to race-conscious classifications that 
seek to include, as opposed to exclude, racial minorities,112 the plurality 
made clear that race-conscious policies, no matter the motive, require strict 
scrutiny.113 As Part IV explains, however, this does not mean that such 
scholarships, even when race-exclusive, are unconstitutional.  
 
 
 In cases where strict scrutiny is not triggered by a race-conscious policy, “courts have not 
provided exact guidance on whether the policy is then subject to rational basis scrutiny or to 
intermediate scrutiny.” Angelo N. Ancheta, Contextual Strict Scrutiny and Race-Conscious Policy 
Making, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 21, 43 n.108 (2004). Ancheta explains: “Recent cases suggest that 
rational basis scrutiny becomes the default standard of review if strict scrutiny is not invoked, although 
one lower court has ruled that race-conscious policies involving elementary and secondary school 
assignment policies should meet the intermediate standard of review.” Id. (citing Comfort ex rel. 
Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 364–66 (D. Mass. 2003)).  
 108. EQUAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, PRESERVING DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION: A MANUAL ON 
ADMISSIONS POLICIES AFTER THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN DECISIONS 76 (2004) [hereinafter EJS 
MANUAL], available at http://www.equaljusticesociety.org/compliancemanual.  
 109. See Banks, supra note 28, at 44 (“Compared to recruitment and support programs, financial 
aid seems most analogous to admissions . . . . Although many applicants may view getting accepted to 
a school as more important than receiving financial aid, the availability of financial aid will often, as a 
practical matter, determine whether an admitted student will be able to attend an institution.”); 
Ancheta, supra note 28, at 23 (“Financial aid can be a decisive factor in a student’s attending a college 
or graduate program . . . and the scarcity of dollars may make scholarships and other forms of aid 
highly competitive. Thus, financial aid policies may be tighter analogies to selective admissions 
procedures than outreach or recruitment.”). 
 110. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
 111. Id. at 2819 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 112. Id. at 2817 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Under this standard, “the judge would carefully examine 
the program’s details to determine whether the use of race-conscious criteria is proportionate to the 
important ends it serves.” Id. at 2819.  
 113. Id. at 2764 (“Our cases clearly reject the argument that motives affect strict scrutiny 
analysis.”). For further discussion of the Supreme Court’s motives and strict scrutiny analysis, see 
infra notes 184–93 and accompanying text.  
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B. The Legal Framework for Strict Scrutiny Review 
The federal courts have not ruled on the constitutionality of race-
conscious scholarships designed to promote student body diversity.114 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has established a general analytical 
framework applicable to a wide range of race-conscious policies and the 
U.S. Department of Education has adopted guidelines—which remain 
official policy as they have not been amended or rescinded—that directly 
address the constitutionality of race-conscious and even race-exclusive 
scholarships.  
In Grutter v. Bollinger115 and Gratz v. Bollinger,116 the Court applied 
strict scrutiny to race-conscious university admissions programs. Under 
strict scrutiny, racial classifications can be constitutional “only if they are 
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental 
interests.”117 First, the Court found that student body diversity constitutes a 
compelling governmental interest and, second, it articulated a series of 
requirements under the narrow tailoring prong.  
1. Compelling Interest 
In Grutter, the Supreme Court, relying in part on the extensive 
research conducted for the over sixty-five amicus briefs118 filed in support 
of the University of Michigan, found that student body diversity is a 
compelling governmental interest because it: (1) has interpersonal and 
 
 
 114. The case law on race-conscious financial aid is extremely sparse. In Podberesky v. Kirwan, 
38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995), one of the only cases to rule on race-
based scholarships since Bakke, the Fourth Circuit held that the University of Maryland’s race-
exclusive Benjamin Banneker scholarship was unconstitutional because the university failed to provide 
sufficient evidence of the link between its past discrimination and contemporary racial problems—
namely its poor reputation among African Americans and its racially hostile environment. While the 
Podberesky ruling is relevant to universities defending scholarships designed to remedy past 
discrimination, “the case is not likely to be a useful precedent for financial aid programs that are 
designed to promote the distinctly different interest in student body diversity [because it] focused on a 
remedial interest that was specifically linked to the past discrimination of the University of Maryland 
. . . .” Ancheta, supra note 28, at 23. Ancheta continued to explain that “[a] non-remedial scholarship 
program designed to promote diversity could be distinguished on basis of the different underlying 
interests and the specific type of program being employed.” Id.  
 115. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 116. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 117. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 118. Among others, the Court relied on briefs by the U.S. Military as well as business, 
professional, and military leaders. For a list of all of the amicus briefs filed in Grutter, see University 
of Michigan, A Case About Diversity, http://www.umich.edu/pres/aate/amicus/ (last visited Feb. 17, 
2009).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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civic benefits;119 (2) has educational benefits;120 (3) better prepares 
students for work in an increasingly diverse world;121 (4) improves the 
military’s ability to provide national security;122 and (5) enhances the 
political legitimacy of America’s leaders.123  
 
 
 119. The Court explained that diversity in higher education “promotes ‘cross-racial 
understanding,’ helps to break down racial stereotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better understand 
persons of different races. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (alteration in original). Writing for the majority, 
Justice O’Connor cited the trial testimony of then-Michigan law professor Kent Syverud, who 
submitted several expert reports explaining that, “when a critical mass of underrepresented minority 
students is present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority students learn there is no 
‘minority viewpoint’ but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority students.” Id. at 319–20; see 
also Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 733, 753 (1998) (studies reveal that “racial and ethnic diversity on college campuses promotes 
learning, increases understanding of racial groups and cultures, reduces racism and prejudice, and 
leads to cordial relationships between students of different racial and ethnic heritage”); Elizabeth 
Mertz et al., What Difference Does Difference Make? The Challenge for Legal Education, 48 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 1 (1998) (finding increases to individual minority student participation when universities 
achieve a critical mass of minority students). 
 120. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (“[S]tudent body diversity promotes learning outcomes . . . .”). Neil 
Rudenstine, former president of Harvard University, has explained that the “fundamental rationale for 
student diversity in higher education [is] its educational value.” Patrick T. Terenzini et al., Racial and 
Ethnic Diversity in the Classroom: Does It Promote Student Learning?, 72 J. HIGHER ED. 509, 510 
(2001) (alteration in original). Lee Bollinger, former president of the University of Michigan, has 
explained that “[a] classroom that does not have a significant representation from members of different 
races produces an impoverished discussion.” Id.  
 121. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (diversity “‘better prepares students for an increasingly diverse 
workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals’”). Citing the amicus brief of the 
General Motors Corporation, the Court noted that “[t]hese benefits are not theoretical but real, as 
major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly global 
marketplace can only be developed though exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and 
viewpoints.” Id. (citing Brief of General Motors Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 2, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“Diversity in academic institutions is essential 
to teaching students the human relations and analytic skills they need to succeed and lead in the work 
environments of the twenty-first century.”). 
 For an insightful critique of Justice O’Connor’s business diversity rationale, see Daria Roithmayr, 
Tacking Left: A Radical Critique of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 213 (2004) (“The Court also 
finds that diversity in education is compelling because it is good for business. Although benefits to 
business are not exclusively benefits to whites, it is important to note the Court’s marked shift from a 
rationale focusing on the benefits to non-whites of eliminating the vestiges of slavery or remedying 
past discrimination to focusing on benefits to business and the military.”).  
Bakke and subsequent decisions undoubtedly encouraged those defending affirmative action 
in Grutter to use arguments couched in the language of “diversity,” as opposed to the kind of 
moral arguments grounded in the existence of past or present discrimination against blacks 
that characterized Brown and the first wave of the civil rights movement. Given the weight 
that Justice O’Connor's opinion grants to the corporate and military briefs in Grutter, future 
advocates for racial justice in both the court of law and the court of public opinion will face 
strong pressure not only to argue in the language of diversity but also to justify diversity in 
terms of the efficient functioning of institutions and the market. 
David B. Wilkins, From “Separate is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity is Good for Business”: The 
Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1548, 1558 (2004). 
 122. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (“[A] highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential 
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Grutter’s compelling government interest in student body diversity 
was recently affirmed, albeit tenuously,124 by the Supreme Court in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.125 
In a 4-1-4 opinion, the Parents Involved Court held that voluntary K-12 
school integration plans in Jefferson County, Kentucky, and Seattle, 
Washington, were not narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny. Despite 
the deeply fractured opinion, “all nine justices—in one form or another—
affirmed the Court’s decision in Grutter that higher education’s interest in 
promoting the educational benefits of diversity can be compelling and can 
be pursued through narrowly tailored race-conscious means.”126 In striking 
down voluntary integration plans, Chief Justice Roberts, in his plurality 
opinion, affirmed Grutter’s pronouncement that “universities occupy a 
 
 
to the military’s ability to fulfill its principal mission to provide national security.”). In making this 
point, Justice O’Connor relied heavily on a brief filed by former high-ranking officers and civilian 
leaders of the armed forces, including members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military academy 
superintendents, secretaries of defense, and several members of the U.S. Senate. The brief explained 
that “the military cannot achieve an officer corps that is both highly qualified and racially diverse 
unless the service academies and the ROTC used limited race-conscious recruiting and admissions 
policies.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (emphasis in original). See also Pamela S. Karlan, Compelling 
Interests/Compelling Institutions: Law Schools as Constitutional Litigants, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1613, 
1625 (2007) (“As the [military] brief explained, ‘[t]he chasm between the racial composition of the 
officer corps and the enlisted personnel’ that persisted until the military adopted various forms of 
affirmative action ‘undermined military effectiveness’ by diminishing unit cohesion and perceptions of 
officer corps legitimacy.”) (alteration in original). 
 123. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332. As the Court explained,  
[U]niversities, and in particular, law schools, represent the training ground for a large number 
of our Nation’s leaders . . . .  
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary 
that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race 
and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the 
openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this training.  
Id. 
 124. While the Chief Justice affirmed Grutter’s compelling interest in student body diversity, his 
opinion revealed deep animosity for race-conscious programming in general. This animosity has led 
some scholars to declare that Parents Involved (or Meredith, its companion case), despite its 
endorsement of Grutter, “puts race-based scholarships and admissions procedures in higher education 
at risk.” Lucie Small, Meredith, Colorblind Constitutionalism, and the Impact on Higher Education, 
37 J.L. & EDUC. 453, 453 (2008). To Small, the colorblind rhetoric of the Roberts opinion “does not 
comport with higher education . . . scholarships designated specifically for minorities.” Id. 
Accordingly, she concludes that race-conscious scholarships “would likely not pass the strict standard 
of review advocated by [Parents Involved, but would pass] . . . under a more deferential standard of 
review that gives preference to state and university determinations . . . .” Id. at 454; see also infra note 
133 (describing Ronald Dworkin’s view that Parents Involved implicitly overruled Grutter).  
 125. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). For an in depth analysis of Parents Involved, see James E. Ryan, The 
Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131 (2007).  
 126. ARTHUR L. COLEMAN, SCOTT R. PALMER & STEVEN Y. WINNICK, ECHOES OF BAKKE 3 
(2007), available at http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/diversitycollaborative/Echoesof 
Bakke.pdf.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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special niche in our constitutional tradition,”127 and within this niche they 
have “expansive freedoms of speech and thought”128 to adopt race-
conscious measures, as part of a “a broader effort to achieve ‘exposure to 
widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.’”129 In his 
controlling concurring opinion,130 Justice Kennedy explained the 
continued need for race-conscious classifications: 
Our Nation from the inception has sought to preserve and expand 
the promise of liberty and equality on which it was founded. Today 
we enjoy a society that is remarkable in its openness and 
opportunity. Yet our tradition is to go beyond present achievements, 
however significant, and to recognize and confront the flaws and 
injustices that remain. . . . The enduring hope is that race should not 
matter; the reality is that too often it does.131  
The impact that Parents Involved will have on affirmative action in 
higher education remains unclear. To one expert, “[t]he rights of colleges 
to use race in admissions decisions for student body diversity had survived 
scrutiny by the most conservative Supreme Court in more than 70 years. 
Since the Supreme Court rarely takes such cases, the Grutter precedent 
might last for a while.”132 Not all commentators agree, however, that 
Grutter survived Parents Involved intact.133  
 
 
 127. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2754 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329). 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 2742 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330).  
 130. James Ryan explains that Justice Kennedy’s opinion “appears controlling . . . because the 
four dissenters would uphold the Seattle and Jefferson County plans and would apply looser criteria to 
assess voluntary integration plans than would Justice Kennedy. A fortiori, they would uphold any plan 
that Justice Kennedy would approve. There are thus five votes for upholding some uses of race to 
achieve integration, but the only vote that really counts is Justice Kennedy’s.” Ryan, supra note 125, at 
137.  
 131. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 132. Gary Orfield, Erica Frankenberg & Liliana M. Garces, Better Than Expected, Worse Than it 
Seems, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC., July 24, 2007, http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2007/07/24/ 
orfield.  
 133. For example, Professor Ronald Dworkin explained:  
[Justice Roberts’] opinion—as Breyer and the other dissenters pointed out—was therefore an 
implicit overruling of Grutter because it rejected O’Connor’s understanding of strict scrutiny 
in favor of the cruder principle that all racially sensitive plans are harmful in themselves, an 
assumption that the Court had explicitly rejected in Grutter and long before. 
. . .  
Kennedy’s separate opinion is important because it means that only four justices, not the 
Court as a whole, have voted to overrule Grutter. 
. . .  
Roberts and his right-wing colleagues voted to overrule the recent Grutter decision by 
stealth—without conceding that they were overruling anything. 
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The Department of Education has also strongly affirmed the 
importance of student body diversity in higher education. In 1994, 
following notice and a significant comment period, the DOE issued a 
Notice of Final Policy Guidance (“Title VI Guidance” or “DOE 
Guidance”)134 designed to “assist colleges in fashioning legally defensible 
affirmative action programs to promote the access of minority students to 
postsecondary education.”135 According to the DOE,  
A college should have substantial discretion to weigh many 
factors—including race and national origin—in its efforts to attract 
and retain a student population of many different experiences, 
opinions, backgrounds, and cultures—provided that the use of race 
or national origin is consistent with the constitutional standards 
reflected in Title VI.136  
As Grutter found that colleges and universities have a compelling 
interest in student body diversity, and as the vast majority of colleges and 
universities justify their scholarships on “diversity” grounds, it is 
important to understand how the Court defines “student body diversity.” 
At the most basic level, the Court equates student body diversity with the 
enrollment of a “critical mass” of minority students.137 Struggling in 
Grutter with the precise definition of critical mass, the Court deferred to 
the judgment of the university: according to one expert, “‘critical mass’ 
means ‘meaningful numbers’ or ‘meaningful representation,’. . . a number 
that encourages underrepresented minority students to participate in the 
classroom and not feel isolated. . . . [T]here is no number, percentage, or 
range of numbers or percentages that constitute critical mass.”138 Another 
 
 
Ronald Dworkin, The Supreme Court Phalanx, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Sept. 27, 2007, at 92, 95–96; see 
also Small, supra note 124, at 457 (“Grutter and Gratz are in danger of being overruled and replaced 
by the new [Parents Involved] standard. [Parents Involved] totally embraced color blind judicial 
rhetoric. . . . Even the current higher education standard is at risk of being found unconstitutional if 
race is used in any way that can be construed as a tipping factor, maintaining a quota system, or having 
an indefinite duration.”). 
 134. See ARTHUR L. COLEMAN, SCOTT R. PALMER & FEMI S. RICHARDS, FEDERAL LAW AND 
FINANCIAL AID: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING DIVERSITY-RELATED PROGRAMS 13 n.10 (2005), 
available at http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/diversitycollaborative/diversity_manual. 
pdf. The Title VI Guidance is not a formal rule; the DOE has the authority to modify the rule as long 
as the changes are consistent with federal law.  
 135. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756 (Feb. 23, 1994). While 
the Title VI Guidance has not been repealed, it has been ignored by the DOE under President George 
W. Bush. See infra notes 148–51 for further analysis of the DOE Guidance.  
 136. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. at 8757.  
 137. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003). 
 138. Id. at 318 (quoting testimony of Erica Munzel, University of Michigan Director of 
Admissions). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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expert testified that “when a critical mass of underrepresented minority 
students is present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority 
students learn there is no ‘minority viewpoint’ but rather a variety of 
viewpoints among minority students.”139 The Court does not offer a 
precise definition of “critical mass” diversity, and an analysis of the proper 
content of that definition is beyond the scope of this Note. For the 
moment, it is sufficient to know that by “student body diversity,” the 
Court really means some form of critical mass diversity that is left largely 
to colleges and universities to define. Notably, the compelling interest in 
student body diversity differs vastly from the original remedial rationale 
underlying race-conscious scholarships.140  
2. Narrow Tailoring  
The Grutter Court set forth four narrow tailoring requirements. First, 
the Court explained that, while race may be used as a plus-factor in 
admissions decisions, it cannot be the exclusive or even predominant 
factor.141 Rather, each applicant must receive an individualized, holistic 
review, with race comprising only one element of the analysis.142 Second, 
 
 
 139. Id. at 319–20 (quoting testimony of Kent Syverud, Dean of Vanderbilt Law School).  
 140. Indeed, the Court’s definition of student body diversity is not inherently race-focused. The 
Court, describing the parameters of the compelling interest in student body diversity, explained that 
“‘[t]here are many possible bases for diversity admissions’ . . . [having] lived or traveled abroad, 
[being] fluent in several languages, hav[ing] overcome personal adversity and family hardship, 
hav[ing] exceptional records of extensive community service, and hav[ing] successful careers in other 
fields.” Id. at 338.  
 This definition has been met with harsh criticism as being overly broad and ahistorical. See, e.g., 
Roithmayr, supra note 121, at 213 (“In Grutter, the compelling government interest that the Court uses 
to justify race-conscious admissions preferences is neither remedying past discrimination nor reducing 
societal discrimination, nor even benefitting the small numbers of students who are admitted via 
diversity programs. Rather, the Court finds a compelling interest in diversifying the classroom for the 
benefit of white students.”); Small, supra note 124, at 456–57 (2008) (explaining that Grutter’s 
conception of diversity “completely ignores the realities of racial inequality . . . . Under this definition, 
one could envision a school composed of all white males, so long as one student happened to be a 
former foster child from Appalachia who spoke German and Mandarin and another student was a 
former engineer who traveled throughout Europe and volunteered for the Peace Corps.”); Scott, supra 
note 15, at 672–73 (addressing the same definition of diversity before Grutter, and explaining that, 
while it may be true that all students benefit from being part of a diverse student body, “it is not [that] 
argument for diversity that makes the state’s interest compelling. What makes the interest compelling 
is the underlying situation which gave rise for the need to diversify. . . [namely] because access to 
education is critical to the elimination of the racially oppressed status of African-Americans.”). 
 141. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336–37 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 
(1978)). 
 142. For an insightful critique of Grutter’s individualized review requirement, see Andrew 
Koppelman and Donald Rebstock, On Affirmative Action and “Truly Individualized Consideration, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. 49 (2006). The authors, one of whom is the Associate Dean of Enrollment, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
1002 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:975 
 
 
 
 
race-conscious admissions plans cannot unduly burden nonminority 
applicants.143 As long as the admissions plan considers both racial and 
nonracial factors in a flexible way, the burden resulting from denial is 
unlikely to be undue because there is no right or entitlement to university 
admissions. Third, narrow tailoring requires “serious, good faith 
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the 
diversity the university seeks.”144 Notably, this does not mean that the 
university must exhaust every possible race-neutral alternative. To the 
contrary, the Court deferred to the university’s good faith effort to 
consider race-neutral alternatives.145 Finally, race-conscious admissions 
programs cannot be implemented on a permanent basis—this “assure[s] all 
citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial 
and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of 
the goal of equality itself.”146 Notably, the durational requirement does not 
require a fixed time limit; rather, it can be satisfied by sunset provisions or 
periodic reviews to determine whether the use of race is still necessary to 
achieve diversity.147  
Applying these standards, the Court in Grutter upheld the University of 
Michigan Law School’s admissions policy, which considered race as one 
factor (along with life experience, personal background, LSAT scores, 
GPA, etc.) in admissions decisions. In Gratz, however, the Court struck 
down the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions plan 
because it was not narrowly tailored. Unlike the law school’s policy, the 
undergraduate policy utilized a point system that allocated a maximum of 
150 points to any given applicant and automatically awarded students of 
color 20 points.148 The Court held that the plan was not narrowly tailored 
 
 
Management, and Career Strategy at Northwestern Law School, argue from their experience that 
“[t]ruly individualized consideration is impossible.” Id. at 49. They explain: 
The authors of this paper know something about the admissions process. Northwestern 
University School of Law has the most individualized law school admissions program in the 
country. We do not, however, delude ourselves that we are achieving perfect justice in our 
admissions decisions. We are making intelligent guesses, based on inevitably limited 
information, about the quality of our applicants. We are proud of the care with which we 
select our students. But we do not think that we are doing justice to the unique personalities 
of each applicant. No admissions process can do that. The Supreme Court has tried to make a 
vain dream into a constitutional requirement.  
Id. at 49–50. 
 143. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341. 
 144. Id. at 339.  
 145. Id. at 339, 340. 
 146. Id. at 342 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989)).  
 147. Id.  
 148. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 255 (2003). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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because the automatic assignment of points lacked the flexibility and 
individualized consideration that defined the law school policy. The Court 
explained that the “automatic distribution of 20 points [one fifth of the 
points needed to guarantee admission] has the effect of making ‘the factor 
of race . . . decisive’ for virtually every minimally qualified 
underrepresented minority applicant.”149  
While the federal courts have not addressed the legality of race-
conscious scholarships designed to promote student body diversity, the 
U.S. Department of Education has. With its Title VI Guidance, the DOE 
sought “to help clarify how colleges can use financial aid to promote 
campus diversity and access of minority students to postsecondary 
education without violating Federal anti-discrimination laws.”150 The 
DOE’s express goal was to “encourage[] continued use of financial aid as 
a means to provide equal educational opportunity and to provide a diverse 
educational environment for all students.”151 To meet this goal, the Title 
VI guidelines recognize three ways in which scholarships may be used to 
promote student body diversity: 
First, a college may, of course, use its financial aid program to 
promote diversity by considering factors other than race . . . such as 
geographic origin, diverse experiences, or socioeconomic 
background. Second, a college may consider race or national origin 
with other factors in awarding financial aid if the aid is necessary to 
further the college’s interest in diversity. Third, a college may use 
race or national origin as a condition of eligibility in awarding 
financial aid if this use is narrowly tailored . . . .152  
Although the Title VI Guidance does not carry the force of law and can be 
revoked at any time, it remains official policy because the DOE has never 
amended or rescinded it.153  
The DOE has changed course since 1994 and is ignoring, if not 
completely contradicting, its Title VI Guidance. According to the 
Chronicle of Higher Education, OCR issued a statement in February 2003 
 
 
 149. Id. at 272 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978)).  
 150. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756, 8756 (Feb. 23, 1994).  
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at 8757. 
 153. In fact, the DOE has only reaffirmed it. See Letter from Judith A. Winston, Gen. Counsel, 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to College & Univ. Counsel (July 30, 1996), available at http://www.ed.gov/ 
print/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/dearcol.html (“I am writing to reaffirm the Department of Education’s 
position that, under the Constitution and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is permissible in 
appropriate circumstances for colleges and universities to consider race in making admissions decision 
and granting financial aid.”).  
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claiming—in direct conflict with its Title VI Guidance—that “generally, 
programs that use race or national origin as sole eligibility criteria are 
extremely difficult to defend.”154 
On August 28, 2008, OCR issued a “Dear Colleague” letter, setting 
forth its interpretation of Title VI and the Grutter opinion.155 Unlike the 
Title VI Guidance, which “encourage[d] continued use of financial aid as a 
means to provide equal educational opportunity and . . . a diverse 
educational environment,”156 the 2008 OCR Letter casts greater 
uncertainty over race-conscious programming. According to one critical 
commentary, the 2008 OCR Letter serves to “truncate and overextend the 
 
 
 154. See Miksch, supra note 39, at 61 (citing Peter Schmidt & Jeffrey R. Young, MIT and 
Princeton Open 2 Summer Programs to Students of All Races, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), 
Feb. 21, 2003, at 31). Miksch explains that “[a]lthough the OCR statement is quoted in the Chronicle 
articles and in the CEO letters, the agency would not provide a copy of the prepared statement to the 
author.” Id. at 61 n.15 (citation omitted). Notably, CEO interpreted the word “programs” to include 
“minority scholarships and fellowships [as well as] recruitment, orientations, and academic-
enrichment programs.” Id. (quoting Peter Schmidt, Not Just for Minority Students Anymore, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Mar. 19, 2004, at A17). 
 155. Letter from Stephanie J. Monroe, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, to Colleagues, Aug. 28, 
2008 [hereinafter 2008 OCR Letter]. 
 156. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. at 8756. The fact that OCR 
is directly contradicting the principles set forth in its Title VI Guidance—which firmly recognized that 
race-conscious scholarships are a permissible and, at times, necessary tool to achieve student body 
diversity—may give rise to a series of administrative claims. First, agency actions that are inconsistent 
with prior actions, when no good reason is articulated, may be arbitrary. As one court explained, “[a]n 
agency’s view of what is in the public interest may change, either with or without a change in 
circumstances. But an agency changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis indicating that prior 
policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored . . . .” Greater Boston 
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970). OCR has never amended or rescinded 
the Title VI Guidelines. 
 Further, the D.C. Circuit, in a controversial opinion, held that, “[o]nce an agency gives its 
regulation an interpretation, it can only change that interpretation as it would formally modify the 
regulation itself: through the process of notice and comment rulemaking.” Paralyzed Veterans of 
America v. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  
 Finally, in 2007, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a bulletin “intended to 
increase the quality and transparency of agency guidance practices and the significant guidance 
documents produced through them.” Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 
3432 (2007). According to the bulletin, “[a]gency employees should not depart from significant 
guidance documents without appropriate justification and supervisory concurrence.” Id. at 3440. As 
OCR has ignored the Title VI Guidance, it has offered no justification for its significant departure from 
it.  
 OCR may be seeking to conceal this inconsistency by not placing the Title VI Guidance on its 
website. The OMB bulletin, which by its terms is not enforceable in court, see id. at 3439, states that 
“[e]ach agency shall maintain on its Web site—or as a link on an agency’s Web site to the electronic 
list posted on a component or subagency’s Web site—a current list of its significant guidance 
documents in effect.” Id. at 3440. OCR, in compliance with this standard, maintains a list of significant 
DOE guidance documents. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Significant Guidance Documents, available at 
http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/significant-guidance.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). Despite 
including numerous guidance documents on higher education and civil rights on its list, OCR does not 
include the Title VI Guidance. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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Grutter framework in a manner that does not properly reflect the Supreme 
Court’s decision.”157 For example, OCR emphasizes that racial 
classifications are “highly suspect” and interprets Grutter to stand for the 
principle that the “[u]se of race must be essential to an institution’s 
mission and stated goals.”158 As explained in Part IV.D below, Grutter did 
not hold that the use of race must be essential. 
Additionally, in challenging so many race-conscious assistance 
programs, OCR may be acting contrary to the DOE’s goal under the 
federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of “closing the achievement 
gap between high- and low-performing children, especially the 
achievement gaps between minority and nonminority students.”159 
Pointing out this paradoxical approach, the NAACP LDF concluded that 
“[i]t is inconsistent, at best, for the federal government to preach to the 
nation about closing the achievement gap between blacks and whites and 
then threaten to cut off the federal funds of educational institutions that are 
trying to make sure qualified African-American children receive a college 
education . . . .”160  
C. The Importance of Context in Strict Scrutiny Analysis 
It is often stated that strict scrutiny is “strict in theory and fatal in 
fact.”161 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s review of laws based on suspect 
classifications or infringing on fundamental rights reveals that “strict 
scrutiny would prove lethal to a statute challenged on Equal Protection 
grounds.”162 Recent challenges to race-conscious policies designed to 
remedy past discrimination and expand opportunities for racial minorities 
 
 
 157. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., Statement of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund on 
Diversity in Higher Education: A Response to OCR’s August 28, 2008 “Dear Colleague” Letter (Sept. 
19, 2008), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/printable.aspx?article=1323. 
 158. 2008 OCR Letter, supra note 155 (emphasis added).  
 159. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1001(3), 115 Stat. 1425, 1440 
(2002). 
 160. NAACP REPORT, supra note 23, at 12. The report continued: “To recognize that ‘the racial 
gap is real’ . . . and to then intensify efforts to take race off the table . . . reflects a profound hostility 
towards the very goal of closing the [achievement] gap.” Id.  
 Notably, NCLB is not the only federal law designed to promote racial equality by directly and 
explicitly considering race. Indeed, “[a] multitude of race-conscious policies have been enacted to 
promote racial equality: The Fair Housing Act, the Voting Rights Act, and No Child Left Behind, to 
name just a few. . . . [R]ace is already a valid and legitimate consideration throughout government 
policymaking.” Banks, supra note 28, at 52.  
 161. Gerald Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (quotation marks omitted). 
 162. Ancheta, supra note 107, at 21.  
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confirm the rigor of strict scrutiny.163 Yet, “no case—not Adarand, Gratz, 
Grutter, or any other—has ever held that the test of ‘strict scrutiny’ means 
that all racial classifications—no matter whether they seek to include or 
exclude—must in practice be treated the same.”164  
Indeed, in its more recent opinions, the Court has affirmed that strict 
scrutiny can be strict in theory and not fatal in fact.165 In Adarand, the 
Court recognized that the “fundamental purpose of strict scrutiny is to 
“take relevant differences” between “fundamentally different situations . . . 
into account.”166 In Grutter, the Court “demonstrat[ed] that [it] meant what 
it said [in Adarand]”167 when it held that “context matters when reviewing 
race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause.”168 
The Grutter court explained that it is the “fundamental purpose” of strict 
scrutiny to “take ‘relevant differences into account.’”169 Further, the Court 
explained that “[n]ot every decision influenced by race is equally 
objectionable, and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for 
carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons 
advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that 
 
 
 163. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007); 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469 (1989).  
 164. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2817 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer went on:  
[C]ontexts differ dramatically one from the other. Governmental use of race-based criteria 
can arise in the context of, for example, census forms, research expenditures for diseases, 
assignments of police officers patrolling predominantly minority-race neighborhoods, efforts 
to desegregate racially segregated schools, policies that favor minorities when distributing 
goods or services in short supply, actions that create majority-minority electoral districts, 
peremptory strikes that remove potential jurors on the basis of race, and others. Given the 
significant differences among these contexts, it would be surprising if the law required an 
identically strict legal test for evaluating the constitutionality of race-based criteria as to each 
of them.  
Id. at 2818.  
 165. The Supreme Court’s decisions in the race-conscious redistricting context further reveal the 
importance of context in strict scrutiny analysis. Pamela Karlan, discussing the Court’s redistricting 
jurisprudence in the three decades between Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Shaw v. Reno, 509 
U.S. 630 (1993), explains: 
Its decisions . . . suggest a nuanced understanding both of what triggers and of what satisfies 
strict scrutiny. The redistricting cases may flesh out the Court’s expressed wish in Adarand—
“to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’” They suggest 
that strict scrutiny may be strict in theory, but rather pliable in practice. 
Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting 
Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1572–73 (2002). 
 166. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228. 
 167. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2817 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 168. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003).  
 169. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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particular context.”170 In light of this holding, the Grutter court—noting 
that universities “occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition,” 
and that their academic decisions are entitled a substantial degree of 
deference171—went on to apply a more relaxed version of strict scrutiny to 
uphold the race-conscious admissions plan.172  
This contextual approach to strict scrutiny analysis is relevant for two 
interrelated reasons. First, Grutter’s substantial deference to university 
decision making highlights the point that race-conscious scholarships 
should be evaluated under a more relaxed strict scrutiny standard than the 
affirmative action contracting programs shot down in Adarand and Croson 
and the school district plans overruled in Parents Involved.173 The Grutter 
court explained that, within their “special niche,” universities have 
“expansive freedoms of speech and thought” to adopt race-conscious 
measures as part of a broader effort to achieve student body diversity.174 
The Court further explained: “‘The freedom of a university to make its 
own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student 
body.’”175 A university’s effort to recruit, retain, and provide aid to 
minority students is a vital part of that selection process because it helps 
 
 
 170. Id.; see also Brian K. Landsberg, Balanced Scholarship and Racial Balance, 30 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 819, 829 (1995) (“The Supreme Court has navigated carefully in its consideration of 
permissible and impermissible uses of race. It has avoided mechanical formulae and blunderbuss rules, 
preferring instead a careful case-by-case consideration of race-conscious decisionmaking.”).  
 171. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328–29. As Professor Pamela Karlan explained, what is striking about 
Grutter “is not that the Court thinks racial diversity within the student body of a selective public 
educational institution can be a compelling governmental purpose, but rather that it declares that racial 
diversity is compelling because a school thinks it is.” Karlan, supra note 122, at 1622. 
 172. Prior to Parents Involved, it was not clear if Grutter’s relaxed application of strict scrutiny 
was due to high levels of deference traditionally granted to colleges and universities, inclusive 
university affirmative action policies, or a combination of the two. In Parents Involved, a majority of 
the Justices rejected the distinction between inclusive and exclusive uses of race and affirmed Grutter 
because colleges and universities occupy a “special niche” in our constitutional tradition. Four 
Justices, however, provided a passionate dissent arguing, inter alia, that it is critical to distinguish 
between inclusive and exclusive policies. See infra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 173. As Pamela Karlan recently explained: 
The context in which the Court hammered out the principle of strict scrutiny for all racial 
classifications was far removed from professional school admissions. Cases such as Adarand 
and [Croson] involved government contracting programs and race-based deviations from 
what would otherwise have been a highly stylized form of decisionmaking: reliance on 
formal, sealed bids. . . . Many government decisions—including, of course, admissions to 
public professional schools—are quite different. They involve multiple, soft factors. This has 
important implications for the application of strict scrutiny.  
Karlan, supra note 122, at 1619.  
 174. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329. 
 175. Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)). 
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“ensure that a diverse student body is actually enrolled and is maintained 
during the academic year, and not just admitted.”176  
Second, the law remains divided on the issue of the standard of review 
for benign classifications that seek to include, as opposed to malicious 
classifications that seek to exclude. Chief Justice Roberts recently stated 
that “[o]ur cases clearly reject the argument that motives affect strict 
scrutiny analysis.”177 Further, “[t]he reasons for rejecting a motives test for 
racial classifications are clear enough. ‘The Court’s emphasis on benign 
racial classifications suggests confidence in its ability to distinguish good 
from harmful governmental uses of racial criteria. History should teach 
greater humility . . . .”178 Yet four members of the Court strongly 
disagreed; Justice Breyer explained, “I have found no case that otherwise 
repudiated this constitutional asymmetry between that which seeks to 
exclude and that which seeks to include members of minority races.”179 
Turning to the importance of context in strict scrutiny review, Justice 
Breyer stated,  
The upshot is that the cases to which [Roberts] refers, though all 
applying strict scrutiny, do not treat exclusive and inclusive uses the 
same. Rather, they apply the strict scrutiny test in a manner that is 
“fatal in fact” only to racial classifications that harmfully exclude; 
they apply the test in a manner that is not fatal in fact to racial 
classifications that seek to include.180 
Even Judge Kozinski, “not generally known as a politically liberal 
judge,”181 held that Seattle’s voluntary integration plan should not be 
subject to strict scrutiny. He explained: “When it comes to a plan such as 
[Seattle’s]—a plan that gives the American melting pot a healthy stir 
without benefitting or burdening any particular group—I would leave the 
decision to those much closer to the affected community . . . .”182 
 
 
 176. THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV., REAFFIRMING DIVERSITY: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES, JOINT STATEMENT OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS 21 (2003) [hereinafter REAFFIRMING DIVERSITY]. See also Paul 
Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 539 (2005).  
 177. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2764 (2007). See 
also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial classifications, 
imposed by [government,] must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”).  
 178. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2765 (citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 
609–10 (1990) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 179. Id. at 2815 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 180. Id. at 2817 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 181. Ryan, supra note 125, at 154. 
 182. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1196 (9th Cir. 
2005) (Kozinski, J., concurring), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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Similarly, Justice Stevens explained in Adarand that the law must 
recognize the difference between “a policy that is designed to perpetuate a 
caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination”183 or, 
more vividly, “between a ‘No Trespassing’ sign and a welcome mat.”184  
Thus, despite the Parents Involved conclusion that motive is irrelevant, 
the fact that four Justices disagree reveals that this is still a live issue that 
should not be ignored. Further, it is significant that, in the context of race-
conscious financial aid programs, both factors—deference to universities 
and benign classifications—are present. As Angelo Ancheta explained: 
A combination of benign motivations and historical deference to an 
institution might produce an inquiry . . . in which there is a minimal 
evidentiary burden imposed to demonstrate the institution’s 
compelling interest, and [in which] good faith can be presumed 
along several dimensions of narrow tailoring, including time limits, 
documenting the necessity of a policy, and considering viable 
alternative policies.185 
IV. RACE-CONSCIOUS SCHOLARSHIPS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL  
When a court applies strict scrutiny, it asks: (1) whether the goal of the 
policy is sufficiently important to constitute a “compelling governmental 
interest” and, if so (2) whether the policy is “narrowly tailored” to further 
 
 
 183. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
 184. Id. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens continued: “It would treat a Dixiecrat 
Senator’s decision to vote against Thurgood Marshall’s confirmation in order to keep African-
Americans off the Supreme Court as on a par with President Johnson’s evaluation of his nominee’s 
race as a positive fact. It would equate a law that made black citizens ineligible for military service 
with a program aimed at recruiting black soldiers.” Id.  
 According to Justice Breyer, an originalist analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment supports Justice 
Stevens’ argument. As the Supreme Court explained in 1879, the purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to “secur[e] to a race recently emancipated . . . all the civil rights that the superior 
race enjoy.” Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879). See also The Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1872) (“[T]he one pervading purpose found in [the Reconstruction 
amendments was] the freedom of the slave race . . . .”). Citing Strauder, Justice Breyer recently 
explained that “the basic objective of those who wrote the Equal Protection Clause [was] forbidding 
practices that lead to racial exclusion. The Amendment sought to bring into American society as full 
members those whom the Nation had previously held in slavery.” Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2815 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Accordingly, “[t]here is reason to believe that those who drafted an 
Amendment with this basic purpose in mind would have understood the legal and practical difference 
between the use of race-conscious criteria in defiance of that purpose, namely to keep the races apart, 
and the use of race-conscious criteria to further that purpose, namely to bring the races together.” Id. at 
2815. 
 185. Ancheta, supra note 107, at 51. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
1010 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:975 
 
 
 
 
that interest.186 The classifications will be constitutional “only if they are 
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental 
interests.”187  
A. Compelling Interest  
The creation of a diverse student body through a race-conscious 
admissions program, as upheld in Grutter, “implies that other policies 
designed to create that diversity should be upheld if they also comply with 
the constitutional requirements of narrow tailoring.”188 In the vast majority 
of cases, the diversity-related interests to be achieved by race-conscious 
financial aid programs are similar, if not identical, to the diversity-related 
goals of race-conscious admissions policies. Thus, Grutter’s compelling 
interest in student body diversity recognized in the admissions context 
should apply equally to financial aid. As one scholar explained: “Grutter 
. . . suggests that universities ought to be able to rely confidently on their 
educational interest in student diversity in maintaining [such] scholarship 
programs.”189 Put simply, if a university has a compelling interest in 
student body diversity and the authority to implement race-conscious 
admissions standards to achieve that interest, “surely it has an equal 
interest in ensuring that it also can ‘attract and retain’ those students who 
serve the educational mission of maintaining student diversity.”190 
Accordingly, in light of the fact that the college attrition rate for African 
Americans is significantly higher than for their white peers,191 the 
preservation of the compelling interest in student body diversity cannot be 
satisfied at the point of admissions. In maintaining a diverse student body, 
it is race-conscious financial aid that can make the difference between 
minority students “continuing their studies or leaving school.”192  
The DOE directly addressed the compelling interest issue in its 1994 
Title VI Guidance and concluded that diversity is a legitimate justification 
for the implementation of a race-conscious scholarship. Discussing the use 
of financial aid to create diversity, the DOE explained that “a college 
should have substantial discretion to weigh many factors—including race 
and national origin—in its efforts to attract and retain a student population 
 
 
 186. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Ancheta, supra note 28, at 20.  
 189. Horwitz, supra note 176, at 539. 
 190. Id.  
 191. See supra note 24.  
 192. GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 10.  
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of many different experiences, opinions, backgrounds, and cultures.”193 
Accordingly, the strict scrutiny analysis should turn on whether the 
program in question is narrowly tailored.  
B. Narrow Tailoring: Scholarships That Consider Race as a Plus Factor 
Scholarships that consider race as one of many factors in the context of 
an individualized, holistic consideration194 (analogous to the Michigan 
Law School admissions plan) should be upheld under a Grutter analysis as 
long as they meet the Court’s other narrow tailoring requirements. Indeed, 
Grutter “provides strong support for the use of race as a plus factor in 
financial aid and scholarship decisions because like admissions, these 
programs strongly influence the composition of the student body.”195  
Affirmative action opponents, however, may argue that Grutter is 
limited to the admissions context and therefore cannot justify a race-
conscious financial aid program. Chief Justice Roberts hinted at the 
viability of this approach in Parents Involved, when he went out of his 
way to distinguish higher education from the K-12 context.196 By 
dismissing any parallels between the two contexts, the Chief Justice 
revealed that he, along with Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Alito, is prepared 
to read Grutter in the narrowest possible way. Because Grutter did not 
 
 
 193. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756, 8756 (Feb. 23, 1994).  
 194. Examples of such scholarships include merit-based scholarships that consider race as a plus 
factor in a competitive selection process or need-based scholarships that consider race as a plus-factor 
by, for example, replacing a work-study requirement with a grant. See EJS MANUAL, supra note 108, 
at 80.  
 195. Id. See also COLEMAN, PALMER & RICHARDS, supra note 134, at 45 (“[I]t is obvious that if a 
scholarship is structured so that . . . race is one factor among others . . . and the consideration of race 
when making the award is pursuant to a whole-file, individualized review, then the practice is much 
more likely to be sustained as lawful—consistent with both the University of Michigan decisions and 
the Department’s Title VI Policy Guidance.”).  
 196. Chief Justice Roberts explained:  
In upholding the admissions plan in Grutter . . . this Court relied upon considerations unique 
to institutions of higher education, noting that in light of “the expansive freedoms of speech 
and thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in 
our constitutional tradition.” The Court explained that “[c]ontext matters” in applying strict 
scrutiny, and repeatedly noted that it was addressing the use of race “in the context of higher 
education.”  
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2754 (2007) (citations 
omitted). The Chief Justice continued to explain that “[t]he Court in Grutter expressly articulated key 
limitations on its holding—defining a specific type of broad-based diversity and noting the unique 
context of higher education—but these limitations were disregarded by the lower courts in extending 
Grutter to uphold race-based assignments in elementary and secondary schools.” Id. 
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address financial aid, one can imagine at least those four Justices further 
confining Grutter to the admissions context alone.197  
To counter this argument, colleges and universities must be prepared to 
show that their plus-factor scholarships are necessary to enroll a diverse 
student body. As one scholar explained:  
Admitting a diverse group of students is only the first step towards 
achieving student body diversity in a given year. The other steps 
include: convincing a diverse group of students to accept the 
admission offer; encouraging that group of students to actually 
enroll and attend the school so that there is a critical mass; and 
ensuring that those students participate in the learning community 
and continue to participate through the years . . . .198  
To prove this point in Grutter, the University of Michigan presented 
statistical evidence revealing that, if race were not considered as part of 
the admissions plan, “underrepresented minority students would have 
constituted 4 percent of the entering class in 2000 instead of the actual 
figure of 14.5 percent.”199 Similarly, a plus-factor financial aid program 
should survive judicial scrutiny so long as a university can provide 
statistical evidence revealing that fewer minority students would enroll if 
the race-conscious scholarships were terminated.200  
While race-based scholarships that mirror the Grutter admissions plan 
should not be hard to justify, race-exclusive scholarships, of which there 
were many,201 present a more challenging narrow tailoring question and 
one which universities approach with caution.  
 
 
 197. See Chris Chambers Goodman, Beneath the Veil: Corollaries on Diversity and Critical Mass 
Scholarships From Rawls’ Original Position on Justice, 13 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 
285, 337 (2007) (“The U.S. Supreme Court roster has changed in the three years since Grutter and 
Gratz, and therefore if a race-conscious financial aid program was granted certiorari, the Court might 
follow reasoning other than that explained in the majority opinions, on the grounds that stare decisis is 
not implicated because of the differences between admissions and financial aid issues.”).  
 198. Id.  
 199. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 320 (2003). See also WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, 
THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND 
UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 32 (1998) (color-blind admissions would reduce the rate of undergraduate 
admissions for African Americans at five selective institutions from forty-two percent of those 
applying to thirteen percent); Jordan J. Cohen, The Consequences of Premature Abandonment of 
Affirmative Action in Medical School Admissions, 289 J. AM. MEDICAL ASS’N 1143, 1148–49 (2003) 
(“[T]here is simply no alternative to the use of race-conscious decision making in medical school 
admission if our society is to have the benefit of a reasonably diverse physician workforce.”). 
 200. EJS MANUAL, supra note 108, at 80. 
 201. For example, the Ervin Program, Ernest A Calloway Jr. scholarship, SUNY scholarships and 
fellowships, and Southern Illinois fellowships were, at one point, all race-exclusive. See supra Part 
II.B.1.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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C. Narrow Tailoring: Race-Exclusive Scholarships 
The constitutionality of race-exclusive scholarships will turn on 
whether they can be distinguished from the race-as-a-plus-factor 
admissions plan struck down in Gratz. The DOE has explicitly held that, 
in certain circumstances, “a college may use race or national origin as a 
condition of eligibility in awarding financial aid if this use is narrowly 
tailored . . . .”202 What circumstances are required for a race-exclusive 
scholarship to be narrowly tailored? Keeping the contextual approach to 
strict scrutiny in mind, we turn to Grutter’s core narrow tailoring 
requirements for the answer.  
1. Flexible, Individualized Consideration 
Taken together, Grutter and Gratz stand for the principle that race 
cannot be the exclusive or primary factor in an admissions decision. As the 
Court explained, “[W]hen using race as a ‘plus’ factor in university 
admissions, a university’s admissions program must remain flexible 
enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not 
in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of 
his or her application.”203  
This reasoning draws race-exclusive scholarships into question 
because, if nonminority students are excluded from basic eligibility, the 
scholarship may not provide the individualized, holistic review that both 
Grutter and Gratz require.204 Thus, as Grutter held that a race-conscious 
admissions program would not be narrowly tailored if it “insulat[es] each 
category of applicants with certain desired qualifications from competition 
with all other applicants,”205 race-exclusive programming of any kind may 
be hard to justify.206  
 
 
 202. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756, 8757 (Fed. 23, 1994) 
(emphasis added). 
 203. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336–37 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 
(1978)). 
 204. Discussing race-exclusive scholarships, Roger Clegg stated, “[s]tudents should be given 
individualized considerations per the Supreme Court decision [in Grutter], but that type of 
consideration is impossible if certain students are not even allowed to apply to programs.” Kinzie 
Goetz, Minority Aid May Expand, INDEP. COLLEGIAN, Mar. 23, 2006. 
 205. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315).  
 206. Indeed, Richard Banks explained that race-exclusive scholarships seem “to mirror the 
admissions quota or set-aside that the Court has unequivocally declared impermissible.” Banks, supra 
note 28, at 45.  
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However, recalling that the “very purpose of strict scrutiny is to take 
. . . ‘relevant differences into account,’”207 there are important contextual 
distinctions between financial aid and admissions that weigh in favor of 
upholding race-conscious scholarships, even when similar admissions 
policies would be struck down.208  
First, a race-exclusive scholarship implemented as an extension of a 
plus-factor admissions policy may not violate Grutter because, “by the 
time the institution makes its scholarship and financial aid decisions, the 
institution has already engaged in the individualized, nonmechanical, 
‘meaningful . . . consider[ation]’ of a student and his or her potential to 
contribute to the diversity of the class . . . .”209 The scholarship, in other 
words, is the means by which the university gives substance to a Grutter-
type admissions policy. The financial aid is essential for the institution to 
realize its diversity goal; students can receive the aid only if they have met 
the standards of the Grutter-type plan.210 Consider a school that admits 
students with physical disabilities but is unable to provide them with 
necessary accessible accommodations, such as ramps or elevators. To 
these students, admission will mean little if structural barriers prevent 
them from actually attending. The same is true with respect to financial 
aid: individual consideration under a Grutter-type admissions plan will 
ring hollow if the school does not provide the students with the resources 
needed to actually attend.  
Second, for some institutions, race-exclusive scholarships are 
necessary to realize Grutter’s goal of student body diversity. According to 
 
 
 207. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228 
(1995)). See also Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. at 8761 (“Whether 
a college’s use of race-targeted financial aid is ‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve . . . [diversity] involves a 
case-by-case determination that is based on the particular circumstances involved.”).  
 208. Banks, supra note 28, at 45; see also Amy Weir, Should Higher Education Race-Based 
Financial Aid be Distinguished from Race-Based Admissions?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 967, 967 (2001) 
(“Higher education admissions and financial aid offices, while similar in appearance, differ in 
fundamental ways. Because of their key differences, the constitutional issues triggered by the offices’ 
official use of race and ethnicity as a criterion in decisionmaking should be scrutinized differently.”). 
 209. EJS MANUAL, supra note 108, at 83. 
 210. See Goodman, supra note 197, at 336 (“Students seeking financial assistance already have 
been through the highly competitive admissions process, and thus the rules can be more relaxed for the 
allocation of financial aid to those already admitted students . . . .”); Maurice R. Dyson, Towards an 
Establishment Clause Theory of Race-Based Allocation: Administering Race-Conscious Financial Aid 
After Grutter and Zelman, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 237, 252 (2005) (“[F]inancial aid is only a 
conduit by which to reinforce admissions offers that in turn may be designed to attract and recruit a 
critical mass of diversity.”); Spector, supra note 34, at 333 (“[T]argeting scholarships on the basis of 
race may be necessary to assure that the diversity goals implemented at the admissions stage actually 
are achieved.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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both the DOE211 and the GAO,212 race-exclusive scholarships can be 
essential to recruiting minority students, convincing those admitted to 
attend, and helping those enrolled to finish. In its Title VI Guidance, the 
DOE agreed with the comments of numerous colleges that, “the use of 
race . . . as a plus factor in awarding financial aid may be inadequate to 
achieve diversity. . . . [I]n some cases, it may be necessary to designate a 
limited amount of aid for students of a particular race or national 
origin.”213 The DOE recognized numerous factual scenarios that could 
support this conclusion. For one, an institution’s “location, . . . reputation 
(whether deserved or not) of being inhospitable to minority students, or its 
number of minority graduates” may make it “unable to recruit sufficient 
minority applicants even if race or national origin is considered as a 
positive factor in admissions and the award of aid.”214 In addition, a 
college that has admitted a “critical mass” of minority students “may find 
that, absent the availability of financial aid set aside for minority students, 
its offers of admission are disproportionately rejected by minority 
applicants.”215 Universities implementing race-exclusive scholarships 
would therefore be wise, in light of the 2008 OCR Letter, to provide 
 
 
 211. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. at 8761. 
 212. According to the GAO:  
Minority-targeted scholarships played an important role in the recruitment, retention, and 
graduation of racial or ethnic minority students . . . .  
First, these scholarships provided a financial benefit that could influence minority students’ 
enrollment decisions. . . .  
Second, [race-exclusive scholarships] helped with recruitment and retention by sending a 
message that the school was serious about wanting minority students to enroll and complete 
their degrees.  
GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 9–10.  
 213. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. at 8761.  
 214. Id. (emphasis added). The DOE continued: “[T]he failure to attract a sufficient number of 
minority applicants who meet the academic requirements of the college will make it impossible for the 
college to enroll a diverse student body, even if race or national origin is given a competitive ‘plus’ in 
the admissions process.” Id.; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 9 (postulating that the 
elimination of minority-targeted scholarships would make it harder for some schools to recruit and 
retain minority students).  
 215. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. at 8761. The GAO Report 
explained how race-exclusive scholarships help to avoid rampant rejection by minority students. 
According to the report, race-exclusive scholarships help to “achieve a critical mass of minority 
students, making the school a more attractive place to enroll for minority students [even those] not 
receiving these scholarships. This critical mass also meant that once minority students enrolled, they 
were less likely to feel isolated and more likely to persist in their studies.” GAO REPORT, supra note 
32, at 9–10. Moreover, race-exclusive scholarships help with recruitment and retention “by sending a 
message that the school [is] serious about wanting minority students to enroll and complete their 
degrees. These scholarships, officials said, provided minority students with evidence of a school’s 
support for diversity—more tangible evidence than an affirmative action statement printed in a school 
recruitment brochure.” Id. 
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evidence demonstrating that race-conscious scholarships are necessary to 
realize Grutter’s goal of student body diversity.216  
Accordingly, under certain circumstances, the lack of flexibility 
inherent in race-exclusive scholarships should not be fatal. This does not 
end the analysis, however, as institutions still must prove that race-
exclusive scholarships do not impose an undue burden on nonminorities. 
2. Undue Burden on Nonminorities 
“To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program must 
not ‘unduly burden individuals who are not members of the favored racial 
and ethnic groups.’”217  
Notably, the Title VI Guidance states that “it is not necessary to show 
that no student’s opportunity to receive financial aid has been in any way 
diminished by the use of race-targeted aid. Rather, the use of race-targeted 
aid must not place an undue burden on students who are not eligible for 
that aid.”218 To determine whether a scholarship imposes an undue burden, 
a court must analyze the scholarship’s place within the context of financial 
aid distribution at the university.  
On the one hand, race-exclusive financial aid may impose a burden 
when it reallocates a fixed resource in order to benefit minorities at the 
expense of nonminorities. For example, the Title VI Guidance states that 
an unconstitutional burden would exist if a university “eliminat[ed] 
scholarships currently received by non-minority students in order to start a 
scholarship program for minority students . . . .”219  
On the other hand, race-exclusive scholarships, under certain 
conditions, may not impose an unconstitutional burden. Whereas Gratz-
style admissions programs have the effect of excluding applicants from a 
university, “the use of race-targeted financial aid . . . does not, in and of 
itself, dictate that a student would be foreclosed from attending a college 
solely on the basis of race.”220 For example, if there are “sufficient 
 
 
 216. See infra notes 252–54 and accompanying text for a discussion of OCR’s interpretation of 
Grutter as requiring the use of race to be “essential to an institution’s mission and stated goals.” 
 217. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003) (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 
497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).  
 218. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. at 8762. 
 219. Id.  
 220. Id.; see also Goodman, supra note 197, at 342 (“Financial aid decisions do not place an 
‘undue burden’ on the non beneficiaries (here, the non-recipients of aid, or those who receive less aid 
than they would like) because the invitation to enroll already has been extended, and thus the applicant 
has the ability to attend the school, as long as he or she can work out the finances.”); Spector, supra 
note 34, at 330 (“Minority scholarship programs do not unduly harm nonminorities because they do 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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opportunities to obtain scholarship dollars through other university 
programs,”221 a race-exclusive scholarship “would shut out students of 
other races only minimally, because the race-based assistance would 
represent a relatively minor portion of the entire pot of aid, and therefore 
would be narrowly tailored enough to withstand legal scrutiny.”222  
When, however, are other opportunities to obtain scholarship dollars 
sufficient? The answer to this question depends on the unique facts of each 
case. According to the Equal Justice Society, a 1994 U.S. General 
Accounting Office (GAO) report223 provides an example of the types of 
evidence institutions should gather to answer this question.224 The GAO 
Report concluded that, while race-exclusive scholarships were 
numerous,225 they accounted for only a small proportion of total 
scholarship dollars. According to the report, race-exclusive scholarships 
“represented no more than 5 percent of all undergraduate and graduate 
scholarships and scholarship dollars. For professional schools, these 
scholarships accounted for 10 percent of all scholarships and 14 percent of 
scholarship dollars.”226 Further, “[o]nly a small percentage of minority 
undergraduate, graduate, and professional students received [race-
exclusive scholarships]. . . . At all three education levels, less than 4 
percent of racial and ethnic minority students received scholarships whose 
only criterion was race or ethnicity.”227 With such a small percentage of 
scholarship money going to such a small number of students, the race-
exclusive program arguably does not impose an unconstitutional burden 
 
 
not bar them from attending college or university. Many alternative financial aid programs exist which 
are not restricted to minority students. Furthermore, most students who receive financial aid, including 
minority students, get assistance from more than one source including various grant, loan and 
scholarship programs. A student who has been denied admission to an institution, however, cannot 
look to alternative sources for admission at that particular institution.”).  
 221. Ancheta, supra note 28, at 33–34.  
 222. Hebel, supra note 29. Notably, further research is needed to understand the burdens that race-
exclusive scholarships impose on nonminority students. As Angelo Ancheta explains, “the burdens 
and costs imposed upon non-minority students must be better understood and measured. If the costs of 
exclusion or relative disadvantage are not significant or burdensome, then race-exclusive programs 
have a much better chance of being upheld.” Ancheta, supra note 28, at 34. 
 223. GAO REPORT, supra note 32.  
 224. EJS MANUAL, supra note 108, at 81. The report notes that an institution should “base this 
evidence on its own budget and financial statements” and that the GAO Report is simply “useful for 
thinking about the kinds of evidence to gather.” Id.  
 225. As of 1991–92, “[a]lmost two-thirds of 4-year undergraduate schools awarded at least one 
minority-targeted scholarship. At the post-graduate level, about one-third of graduate schools and 
nearly three-fourths of professional schools awarded at least one minority-targeted scholarship.” GAO 
REPORT, supra note 32, at 4.  
 226. Id. at 4. 
 227. Id. at 7. 
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on nonminorities. Defending two race-exclusive scholarship programs at 
SIU, Jerry D. Blackmore, the university’s general counsel, embraced this 
approach:  
[W]ith a combined annual budget of about $200,000, [the two 
programs] “are only two of many” university programs that provide 
a total of more than $12-million in financial assistance to more than 
4,000 graduate students each year. To focus on the lack of white 
students among the 27 recipients of the Graduate Dean’s 
fellowships without at least “noting the myriad of options available 
to all graduate assistants would simply be unconscionable.”228  
Accordingly, “[W]hile race-conscious admissions may shut out a 
student from a particular college, giving out aid based on race does not 
prevent nonminority students from getting financial assistance.”229 Thus, 
race-exclusive scholarships, unlike admissions quotas, are not per se 
unconstitutional; on the contrary, each scholarship must be evaluated 
“within the larger context of a university’s overall allocation of scarce 
resources”230 to determine whether an undue burden exists.231 
Furthermore, the Title VI Guidance explains that nonminority students 
would not necessarily benefit from, and may even be hurt by, the 
elimination of race-exclusive scholarships. Unlike the finite number of 
admissions slots, “the amount of financial aid available to students is not 
 
 
 228. Schmidt, supra note 57. Even the American Council on Education has found that race-based 
scholarships have little to no impact on white students:  
“[T]he availability of minority directed financial aid [has not] denied nonminorities the 
assistance necessary to finance higher education. Typically, once an institution has made 
admissions decisions, the institution determines the type of financial aid that may be offered 
to students requesting it. In accordance with guidelines from OCR . . . colleges and 
universities have targeted scholarship and fellowship funds for minorities in such a manner 
that the financial aid program as a whole remains nondiscriminatory.  
Spector, supra note 34, at 330 (quoting Letter from Robert H. Atwell, President, Am. Council on 
Educ., to John H. Sununu, White House Chief of Staff (Dec. 17, 1990) (on file with Iowa Law 
Review)) (emphasis added).  
 229. Jeffrey Selingo, New Guidebook Will Help Race-Based Student-Aid Programs Avoid 
Straying From Supreme Court Rulings, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Mar. 28, 2005 at A34. 
 230. Ancheta, supra note 28, at 33.  
 231. As Jonathan Alger, general counsel at Rutgers University, explained:  
If . . . an institution has plenty of aid available for all students, regardless of race, race-
conscious scholarships may have little or no impact on students who do not receive those 
awards. If financial-aid resources are scarce, however, then the burdens imposed by the 
consideration of race in such scholarships need to be considered carefully with that factor in 
mind.”  
Jonathan Alger, Putting the Michigan Ruling into Practice, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), 
Feb. 25, 2005, at B28.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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necessarily fixed . . . [and] may increase or decrease based on the 
functions it is perceived to promote.”232 For example, “a college’s receipt 
of privately donated monies restricted to an underrepresented group might 
increase the total pool of funds for student aid in a situation in which, 
absent the ability to impose [a race-based] limitation, the donor might not 
provide any aid at all.”233 With respect to its own resources, a college, in 
response to the barring of race-exclusive aid, may elect to rechannel the 
funds from financial aid “into other methods of [minority] recruitment.”234 
It is clear, therefore, that “a decision to bar the award of race-targeted 
financial aid will not necessarily translate into increased resources for 
students from non-targeted groups.”235 To the contrary, it is possible that 
nonminority students benefit from race-exclusive scholarships; were such 
scholarships to disappear, there would be more students competing for the 
pool of general scholarship funds.  
The argument against an undue burden can be further strengthened if 
the university in question claims to meet 100% of the demonstrated 
financial need of its students. For example, Columbia University states 
that it “meets 100% of the demonstrated financial need for all students”;236 
Bowdoin College “meet[s] the full calculated need of all enrolling 
students”;237 and at Amherst College, “[o]ur financial aid meets your ‘full 
demonstrated need’—there is no ‘gap’ or unmet need in our aid 
awards.”238 One source maintains that, as of March 2007, sixty-seven 
colleges “promise to meet full demonstrated financial need of all admitted 
students.”239 Richard Banks explained that, “[i]n a financial aid program 
 
 
 232. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756, 8762 (Feb. 23, 1994). 
Banks explains that “increased funding may dramatically expand [race-based assistance programs], in 
contrast to admissions where, for example, a school’s physical facilities may limit the size of the 
student body . . . .” Banks, supra note 28, at 43.  
 233. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. at 8762.  
 234. Id.  
 235. Id.  
 236. Columbia University Office of Undergraduate Admissions—Financial Aid, http://www. 
studentaffairs.columbia.edu/admissions/finaid/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). 
 237. Student Aid for Prospective Students, Bowdoin University, http://www.bowdoin.edu/ 
studentaid/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).  
 238. Amherst College Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.amherst.edu/~finaid/firstyear/ 
faq.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). 
 239. Some examples include Amherst College, Antioch College, Brown University, Carleton 
College, College of the Holy Cross, Connecticut College, Emory University, Georgetown University, 
Grinnell College, Harvard University, Haverford College, Middlebury College, Northwestern 
University, Occidental College, Salem College, Smith College, Stanford University, Thomas Aquinas 
College, University of Virginia, Washington University in Saint Louis, Williams College, and Yale 
University. Carolyn Z. Lawrence, Which Schools Meet Full Need?, AdmissionsAdvice.com, Mar. 17, 
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that meets each student’s demonstrated financial need and no more, a 
racial designation attached to any aid funds (perhaps at the behest of a 
donor) would influence the distribution of specific aid funds, but not the 
amount of aid available[,] . . . [so] no white student would be denied 
funding as a result of the [scholarship].”240  
Overall, the burdens imposed on nonminority students in the financial 
aid context are “diffused and considerably less than in admissions 
decisions.”241 Accordingly, unlike a race-exclusive admissions policy 
(such as a quota), which cannot be narrowly tailored, a race-exclusive 
scholarship, when a university can show that it does not burden 
nonminorities, should survive strict scrutiny as long as it complies with the 
remaining narrow tailoring requirements.  
3. Race-Neutral Alternatives 
Narrow tailoring also “require[s] serious, good faith consideration of 
workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the 
university seeks.”242 Significantly, narrow tailoring “does not require 
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative”243 and a 
university need not consider “alternatives [that] would require a dramatic 
sacrifice of diversity [or] academic quality . . . .”244 There is a wealth of 
evidence revealing that, compared to race-exclusive programs, race-
neutral programs like class-based affirmative action consistently reduce 
the rate of undergraduate and graduate admissions for racial minorities.245 
Because courts will defer to an institution’s good faith effort to seek out 
race-neutral alternatives,246 this requirement can be met as long as the 
 
 
2007, http://collegehunt.blogspot.com/2007/03/which-schools-meet-full-need.html. This list does not 
include “schools that meet full need for very close to 100% of students.”  
 240. Banks, supra note 28, at 45. Notably, it might also be argued that when a university meets 
one hundred percent of student need, the justification for race-based scholarships decreases. If all 
needs are being met there is arguably no reason to go to the extreme of imposing a race-based 
classification.  
 241. REAFFIRMING DIVERSITY, supra note 176, at 2; see also Goodman, supra note 197, at 344 
(compared to the burden of being denied admissions, the denial of race-based financial aid “is much 
lower, and farther from an ‘undue’ burden”).  
 242. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 340. 
 245. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 197, at 326–27. The author cites numerous studies finding 
that affirmative action programs that use socioeconomic status, as opposed to race, are ineffective in 
increasing racial and ethnic diversity. She explains that “if socio-economic status becomes an 
important factor in admissions, it results in more lower-income Anglos and Asians being admitted, 
rather than increasing the number of admitted African American and Latino students.” Id.  
 246. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (“We take the Law School as its word that it would ‘like nothing 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/4
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university can show that the alternatives in question are not sufficient to 
achieve the stated goal.247  
4. Time Limits 
To be narrowly tailored, “race-conscious admissions policies must be 
limited in time.”248 This applies to race-conscious scholarships because 
“all ‘race-conscious programs must have reasonable durational limits.’”249 
In the context of higher education, this requirement “can be met by sunset 
provisions . . . and periodic reviews to determine whether racial 
preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”250 As 
with race-neutral alternatives, federal courts are likely to defer to the 
university as long as it makes a good faith showing. As Grutter explained, 
“We take the Law School at its word that it . . . will terminate its race-
conscious admissions program as soon as practicable.”251  
D. Colleges and Universities Are Abandoning Constitutional Scholarships 
Colleges and universities need not succumb to OCR and CEO/ACRI 
because, as explained above, their pressure is founded on flawed legal 
reasoning. That reasoning, set forth in the 2008 OCR Letter, 
misunderstands and overstates the law set forth in Grutter and Gratz.  
For example, according to OCR, the “use of race must be essential to 
an institution’s mission and stated goals.”252 The Supreme Court has never 
held, however, that the use of race need be essential. To the contrary, the 
Court in Grutter stated that a school’s “educational judgment that [student 
body] diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we 
defer.”253 The Court’s holding was that the use of race must be narrowly 
tailored to achieve the school’s interest in student body diversity. The 
 
 
better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula’ . . . .”); see also Ancheta, supra note 107, at 51 
(“[G]ood faith can be presumed along several dimensions of narrow tailoring, including . . . 
documenting the necessity of a policy, and considering viable alternative policies.”).  
 247. See Ancheta, supra note 28, at 34 (“The necessity and effectiveness of minority-only 
programs and scholarships should be thoroughly documented if they are to survive legal challenges; 
the benefits of minority-only programs relative to plus-factor selection procedures or race-neutral 
policies must be demonstrated in order to show that the alternatives to minority-only programs are not 
truly workable.”).  
 248. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342. 
 249. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent Bollinger et al. at 32, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241)).  
 250. Id.  
 251. Id. at 343. 
 252. 2008 OCR Letter, supra note 155 (emphasis added). 
 253. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
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Grutter court does not state, let alone imply, that narrow tailoring requires 
the use of race to be essential.254 
The 2008 OCR Letter reiterates that “[b]efore using race, there must be 
serious good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives.”255 
Grutter did not hold, however, that institutions have the burden of proving 
that race-neutral alternatives are not workable; on the contrary, the Court 
required only that institutions consider workable race-neutral alternatives 
in good faith.256 Thus, institutions that implement race-based scholarships 
“must seriously consider the alternatives but should not be required to 
prove that alternatives are not ‘workable.’”257 
There is a disconnect, therefore, between Grutter’s endorsement of 
race-conscious classifications to achieve student body diversity and the 
widespread abandonment of both race-exclusive and race-as-a-plus-factor 
scholarships. Of the at least seventy-one programs that were challenged by 
CEO, the vast majority no longer consider race in any way; instead, the 
programs have either been terminated completely or refocused around 
socio-economic status or student “commitment to a diverse campus.”258 
Remarkably, of those seventy-one programs, “only 7 continue to consider 
race as one factor in ensuring campus diversity.”259 It is clear, therefore, 
that “institutions are modifying their programs more than may be legally 
required due to fear of an OCR investigation or pressure from advocacy 
groups.”260 No federal law or policy—not Grutter, not Title VI, not the 
Title VI Guidance—requires a university to terminate the use of race 
altogether; to the contrary, they each stand for the principle that, when 
carefully considered, race can be used to promote student body diversity. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the risk of losing federal funds under Title VI is undeniably 
high, so too is the risk that our nation’s institutions of higher education, 
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 255. 2008 OCR Letter, supra note 155. CEO has made similar demands. In a November 2004 
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objectives.” Miksch, supra note 39, at 67 (quoting a November 18, 2004, OCR letter to the Wisconsin 
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under pressure from just two small legal advocacy organizations, are 
surrendering their freedom to craft and retain their student bodies as they 
see fit. Despite Grutter’s clear endorsement of race-conscious 
classifications to achieve student body diversity, efforts to achieve such 
diversity have been effectively obstructed by both private interest groups 
and the Department of Education. As this Note has made clear, colleges 
and universities are responding to these pressures by unnecessarily 
abandoning programs that are likely constitutional and, more often, 
unnecessarily eliminating all use of race from their financial aid programs.  
After Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,261 it was Justice 
Powell’s lone concurrence that, for twenty-five years, governed the law of 
race-conscious programming in higher education. If Justice Kennedy’s 
similarly situated Parents Involved concurrence commands similar staying 
power, then, perhaps, it is the best place to look for guidance. As Justice 
Kennedy stated, “[t]his Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill 
its historic commitment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal 
opportunity for all of its children.”262 Because he sanctioned the use of 
race-conscious measures to promote such opportunity, the rationale 
supporting race-conscious scholarships remains viable.  
Yet so far, institutions have been so quick to bow to CEO/ACRI and 
OCR pressure that the courts have not been called on to resolve the legal 
debate on race-conscious scholarships. Indeed, the de facto power to shut 
down race-conscious scholarships today rests in the hands of one 
government agency and two small anti-affirmative action advocacy 
groups.  
While the risks are admittedly high, institutions implementing race-
exclusive scholarships (and clearly race-as-a-plus-factor scholarships) 
need not fold to outside pressure in fear of adverse adjudication. As this 
Note makes clear, race-conscious scholarships in the mold of Grutter are 
likely constitutional and, while race-exclusive scholarships may be harder 
to defend, they are not per se unconstitutional. Institutions must look to the 
factors discussed in Part III above to decide if their specific scholarship 
programs can survive strict scrutiny. If universities really value race-
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conscious scholarships, they should do all that they can to stand together 
in defense of their programs, challenge their critics, and be prepared to let 
the courts decide.  
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